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COMMENT
"VIEWER DISCRETION IS ADVISED": A STRUCTURAL
APPROACH TO THE ISSUE OF
TELEVISION VIOLENCE
STEPHEN J. Kim-
Violence on T. V. is a problem, clearly, and a major contributor to the aura
of dread and menace that permeates our culture. It's also the kind of
problem Congress has every right to make a stink about and no business
trying to remedy through legislation.'
INTRODUCTION
The issue of television violence presents a most unsettling
dilemma-a conflict between the desire to protect the public from
potentially harmful mass-communicated influences and the desire
to preserve the electronic media's First Amendment rights. For
forty years, television activists, legislators, social scientists, and
members of the television industry have debated all sides of this
issue.2 At one extreme, the television industry's most vehement
t A.B. 1990, Brown University;J.D. Candidate 1995, University of Pennsylvania;
M.A. Candidate 1995, AnnenbergSchool for Communication, University of Pennsylva-
nia. I would like to thank Professors Edwin Baker, George Gerbner, Fritz Kubler, and
Charles Wright for contributing their enormous expertise and enthusiasm to this
Comment. I am also greatly indebted to the Comments Office, David Anderman,
Jason DeSanto, Lisa Marino, and especiallyJulie Chung for their encouragement and
careful editing of earlier drafts.
This Comment is dedicated to AndrewJay Schwartzman and Gigi Sohn for their
tireless devotion to the public interest, and to my parents for their love and support.
' Tom Shales, Family Hour: An Idea Whose Time Has Gone-and Come, WASH. POST,
Oct. 20, 1993, at BI (author is a television critic for the Washington Post).
2 The debate over television violence is almost as old as the medium itself. For
a chronological synopsis of various formal government inquiries into television
violence, beginning with the 1954 Kefauver hearings before the Senate Subcommittee
onjuvenile Delinquency, see LES BROWN, LES BROWN'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TELEVISION
596 (3d ed. 1992). See also 1 HEALTH SERVS. & MENTAL HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: MEDIA CONTENT
AND CONTROL (George A. Comstock & Eli Rubinstein eds., 1972) [hereinafter
TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR]. For a review of the social science literature
covering the television violence issue, see GEORGE GERBNER & NANCY SIGNORIELLI,
VIOLENCE AND TERROR IN THE MASS MEDIA: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 29-45
(UNESCO Reports & Papers on Mass Communication No. 102, 1988). See also E.
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detractors argue that the effects of televised violence on society,
especially on children, demand state intervention in the form of
program content censorship.' At the other extreme, industry
advocates hoist the sacred banner of First Amendment rights while
denying any correlation between violent programming and negative
social effects.4  Between these poles, concerned observers who
believe television violence has at least some negative impact on
viewers, and yet would rather not risk the chilling effect of govern-
ment content regulation, are left searching for more acceptable
alternatives.
5
This Comment addresses the issue of television violence from a
structural perspective which recognizes program content as the
product of a complex web of market, organizational, legal, and
occupational constraints that restrict creativity and innovation in the
industry. Viewed from this perspective, the problem of television
violence emerges as a symptom of a larger dilemma: the industry's
reliance on the convention of violence is an example of how
networks, advertisers, and producers have fallen into a cycle of
Barrett Prettyman,Jr. & Lisa A. Hook, The Control of Media-Related Imitative Violence,
38 FED. COMM. L.J. 317, 322 nn.10-11 (1987) (listing congressional hearings on
television violence).
' See, e.g., Television and Radio Program Violence Reduction Act of 1993, H.R.
2837, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (requiring the Federal Communications Commission to
prohibit violent television programming); Anne M. Kilday, Brjant Targets TV Violence,
Criticizes Network Inaction, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 15, 1993, at 6A ("'Basically
what [H.R. 2837] does [is] treat violence like pornography .... There's all kinds of
things we don't put on TV, because in our society it is viewed as harmful.'" (quoting
Rep. John Bryant, sponsor of H.R. 2837)).
' See, e.g.,James A. Albert, Constitutional Regulation of Televised Violence, 64 VA. L.
REV. 1299, 1307 (1978) (quoting columnist Edith Efron's rejection of social science
television violence studies); Joan Connell, Congress Putting the Heat on Television
Violence; But Critics Call Action a "Big Chil4"TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 7,
1993, at A8 (quoting Leonard Hill, producer of Dead Before Dawn and I Can Make You
Love Me, and a vehement objector to congressional threats to curb television violence,
as saying: "[tihis is censorship, its effect on the whole industry will be chilling").
' See Tom Feran, Senator Rattles Saber to Cut TV Violence, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Aug. 3, 1993, at 6A (noting that some TV insiders recognize a television
violence problem yet fear government regulation); see also Shales, supra note 1, at B1-
2 (advocating the creation of a "Family Hour" or "Family Viewing Time" which would
be restricted to programs suitable for family viewing). Peggy Charren, founder of
Action for Children's Television, states that
Congress frightens me more than the industry in this case. There are many
reasons for the industry to shape up; to meet the needs of Congress I don't
think is appropriate. I regard the First Amendment as more important that
what children see on television. I am pro-choice in television programming.
Feran, supra, at 6A.
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dependence on formulae and routines to deal with uncertainty in
the television market. Solutions to this problem require the
removal of structural constraints rather than the imposition of
additional content-based restrictions which, unfortunately, have
recently gained public momentum.
Though the debate over television violence has raged almost
since the first set flickered to life,6 1993 witnessed a remarkable
shift in the balance of power in favor of would-be regulators.
7
Perhaps because of increased public concern with the rising levels
of violence in American society,' legislators who were previously
willing to rely on industry-initiated measures to deal with the
violence problem were now poised to control the nation's video diet
with government regulation.9 In 1993, legislators introduced seven
different proposals designed to attack the problem of television
violence.10 If ever there was a time for alternatives that address
both the public interest and constitutional concerns, it is now.
This Comment argues that the current legislative approach of
content-based labeling regulation fails to address the structural roots
of television violence. Above all else, television is a business, and
any attempt to influence television content must treat it as such.
Effective regulation of television violence cannot focus on isolated
6 See BROWN, supra note 2, at 596 (chronicling congressional hearings on television
violence that began in 1954).
7 See George Gerbner et al., Television Violence Profile No. 16: The Turning
Point-From Research to Action 2-3 (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (describing the ascent of television violence in the national political agenda).
8 According to an MTV poll of 16- to 29-year-olds, the issue of violence surpassed
jobs and the economy as the most pressing problem facing young people in 1993.
See Sheila Rule, The Pop Life, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1994, at C13. Recent years have
also seen an increase in incidents of violence by children. See Mike Capuzzo, The End
of Innocence?: A Generation that Has Lost Its Way-and Its Childhood-to Violence, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Nov. 14, 1993, at G1. Capuzzo wonders if 1993 should be remembered as
the "Year of the Evil Child," because of the large number of well-publicized violent
crimes involving children, including the case of two British boys who allegedly
kidnapped, beat, and murdered two-year-oldJames Bolger on February 12, 1993. See
id. Such events, along with a heightened preoccupation with the subject in the news
and entertainment media, "ha[ve] caused parents and policymakers to voice alarm
over the roots and causes of the seeming epidemic of violence by children." Id.
' Congressman John Bryant, sponsor of the Television and Radio Program
Violence Reduction Act of 1993, H.R. 2837, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., explained that the
networks' failure to take action to reduce violent programming on their own initiative
prompted him to consider congressional action: "[T]hey are not going to do anything
about it, obviously, so we are going to turn it over to the FCC." Kilday, supra note
3, at 6A; see also Albert, supra note 4, at 1315 (describing the history of congressional
inactivity in the television violence context as a "tradition of inertia").
"o See infra part II.A.
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post hoc measures punishing the transmission of violent material,
but must instead influence the structural incentives motivating
television producers to rely on formula violence. Instead of
targeting violence as a specific category of objectionable material,
policymakers should develop broad-based strategies to promote
diversity in television content by increasing the incentives to
produce innovative nonviolent programming." This strategy skirts
the dangers of content-based regulation and avoids the especially
sticky problem of defining violence.
12
In pursuing this strategy, policymakers should target not only
broadcast television, but all forms of video media, including cable
and satellite television, as well as emerging technologies (such as
interactive video). 3 The promise of new communications technol-
ogies provides an excellent opportunity for policymakers to reexam-
ine the nation's basic information goals and the best means to attain
them. 4
Similarly, a comprehensive structural strategy for encouraging
nonviolent program diversity should encompass all types of
programming, not just fictional programming, which is the usual
target of attacks on television violence. The contribution of tabloid
news shows, reality crime programs, the evening news, and even
" See Prettyman & Hook, supra note 2, at 381. The authors note that
[o]pinion polls indicate that the public favors a reduction in media violence,
and yet viewers increasingly watch violent scenes in theatres and in their
homes.... What is clearly needed is public support.., for research into
whether any new kinds of programming can be devised that will provide
successful competition to present-day violence.
Id.
12 See infra part II.C.
"s An especially interesting spin-off of the television violence problem is the issue
of violence in video games. At the same time that the debate over television violence
was heating up in the Congress, video game manufacturer Acclaim released four
home versions of"Mortal Kombat," the top grossing American video arcade game in
1992. See Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Too Violentfor Kids?, TIME, Sept. 27, 1993, at 70. One
journalist described the game's characters' "finishing moves" as "bloody, decapitating
uppercut[s]," "electrocution," and punches through the chest that "rip out a still
beating heart." Id. One character "likes to tear his foe's head off and hold it up in
victory, spinal cord still twitching as it dangles from the neck." Id. Although this
issue parallels the television debate in many ways, the topic is outside the scope of
this Comment.
14 "At this critical moment in our national history, it is imperative to assess our
basic tools as the United States goes forward into the new century to communicate
and compete in the global marketplace." HENRY GELLER, FIBER OPTIcs: AN
OPPORTUNITY FOR A NEW POLICY? 7 (1991).
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televised sporting events 15 to the violent face of television should
be considered as well.1
6
Part I will briefly summarize the scope of the violence debate by
outlining the various positions advocates have taken on the issue.
There are many conflicting theories on why violent television is bad
and each perspective produces its own notion of how violence
should be reduced. This Comment will try to find the common
ground between these perspectives and suggest strategies that
accommodate as many different approaches as possible.
7
Part II will provide an overview of the remarkable rise of
television violence as a publicly debated issue in 1993. This Part of
the Comment will pay special attention to the legislative assault on
violent content.
Part III will present legal and policy arguments against the
content-based labeling approach currently embraced by legislators
working to reduce violence. This Part will argue that the labeling
measures proposed in Congress during 1993 will (1) face serious
First Amendment challenges in the courts; and (2) fail to address
the root structural causes of television violence.
The basis for the second argument in Part III is set forth in
detail in Part IV, which presents a view of television violence from
a structural approach, examining the technological, legal, organiza-
tional, market, and occupational influences in the television industry
that collectively shape the violent nature of the medium. Any
attempt to reduce television violence must recognize and confront
15 See Anna Quindlen, Time to Tackle This, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 17, 1993, at 17 (noting
that shelters for battered women report increased calls during and after televised
football games, particularly on Super Bowl Sunday, which some shelters say is one of
the busiest days of the year).
16 Indeed, this type of approach acknowledges, and answers, the common (and
legitimate) complaint that "[t]he campaign against violence seems focused on prime-
time dramatic shows.., but ignores the excesses of sleazy afternoon talk shows, local
news reports that sensationalize violent crime and 'reality-based' programs that wrap
violence and predatory sex in the mantle ofjournalism." Connell, supra note 4, at A8.
'7 This Comment will avoid engaging in an in-depth analysis of the validity of
empirical evidence investigating the correlation between television violence and
viewer effects. Instead, this Comment will recognize the different theories of
opposition to violent programming and suggest that a structural approach promoting
increased viewer choice in programming can satisfy many of these competing
positions. This Comment will also skirt some of the equally troubling peripheral
issues of television violence, including the tendency in entertainment programs to
portray the perpetrators of violent acts as white males and their victims as "female,
non-white, foreign-born or elderly." John Murray et al., Yes, Mayhem Does Echo in Our
Lives, USA TODAY, Aug. 2, 1993, at 9A.
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these structural influences that encourage the production of violent
materials.
Finally, Part V will build upon the analysis and framework of
Parts III and IV to recommend areas where policymakers should
aim to break the cycle of the television industry's reliance on
violence and other program conventions.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUE OF TELEVISION VIOLENCE
A. The Frequency of Violence and Its Effects
The popular impression that violence is widespread in the
television landscape is supported by empirical evidence investigating
the subject. According to data collected through the annual
Violence Index project at the Annenberg School for Communication
at the University of Pennsylvania, although the total number of
violent incidents on television has declined slightly in recent years,
violence continues to pervade prime-time broadcast network
television."8 During an average week of the 1992-1993 season,
slightly more than half (fifty-two percent) of all major characters
appearing in prime-time network shows were involved in acts of
violence."9 Sixty-five percent of all prime-time fictional dramatic
programs included violent material.2 Saturday morning children's
animated shows continued to out pace other programming with
ninety percent of such cartoons and eighty percent of cartoon
characters involved in violence. 2' The 1993 Violence Index also
studied cable-originated programming, finding cable children's
programming "substantially less" violent than broadcast fare.
22
General cable-originated programming, however, rated more violent
than comparable broadcast programming.
23
" The Violence Profile study, part of the Cultural Indicators Project, began during
the 1967-1968 television season and is a systematic compilation of television violence
data that is analyzed and published in regular Violence Profiles. See George Gerbner
& Larry Gross, Living with Television: The Violence Profile, 26 J. COMM. 173, 174
(1976).
19 See Gerbner et al., supra note 7, at 10. For the purposes of the Violence Index,
"violence" is defined as "clear-cut, unambiguous, and overt episodes of physical
violence-hurting or killing or the threat of hurting and/or killing in any context."
Id. at 5. The matter of defining "violence" and its importance in the television debate
is discussed infra part II.C.
20 See Gerbner et al., supra note 7, at 6.
21 See id.
I Id. at 7.
23 See id.
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Another study, released in late 1993 by North Dakota Senator
Byron Dorgan, counted an average of ten violent acts per hour
during a one-week period of prime-time network television24 and
seventy-six incidents of violence per hour during a single Saturday
morning of children's cartoons.25 A comparison between a dozen
cable channels and the broadcast networks revealed that the
network broadcasts averaged more violent acts per hour (11.3) than
their cable counterparts (8.4).26
However, while the numbers suggest a common ground for
critics of violence, the empirical evidence alone fails to reflect the
diversity of opinion regarding the effect of so much violent material
on viewers. The degree and nature of people's concerns over the
amount of television violence vary widely. Generally, opponents of
television violence fall into the following categories, which, although
neither comprehensive nor exclusive, are intended to illustrate the
diversity of theories motivating the criticism of television vio-
lence:
2 7
24 See Marilynn Wheeler, TVSurvey Finds 10 Violent Incidents Per HourDuringPrime
Time, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 29, 1993, at F6. The survey, analyzing 150 hours of
prime-time network television between September 28 and October 4, 1993, defined
violence as "the deliberate and hostile use of overt force by one individual against
another." Id.
2 See id.
26 See id.
27 For a brief summary of some of the many arguments made in defense of
television violence, see Albert, supra note 4, at 1306-07 (reporting industry executives'
andjournalists' criticism of empirical evidence linking television violence with viewer
aggression); Thomas F. Baldwin & Colby Lewis, Violence in Television: The Industry
Looks at Itself, in TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 2, at 290, 298-363
(providing statements of producers, writers, and others responsible for the content
of television programs explaining why they use violence in their programs); George
A. Comstock, New Research on Media Content and Control (Overview), in TELEVISION AND
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 2, at 1, 22 (arguing that violent entertainment is
"cathartic" and responsibly portrayed so that it actually discourages viewers from
engaging in violent behavior).
Perhaps the most logically appealing retort to industry claims that television
violence has no impact on viewers is the argument that, if content indeed has no
effect, then the industry must be based on a sham:
The fundamental premise of television is based on at least one of two lies.
If a 15-second commercial can prompt the viewer to buy (or vote), the 25
acts of violence per hour will likewise prompt the targeted viewers to
similarly respond with violence. If television does sell what it promises,
television is much worse for society than all the illegal and legal drugs you
could name. If this is not true, then all TV advertising is sold on a
fraudulent premise and a lot of stupid marketers have bought a lot of dead
air space from crooked TV marketing departments.
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(1) Direct Correlation. At one extreme, many believe that
exposure to television violence can lead to violent acts in real life.
A recent report of the American Psychological Association's
Commission on Violence and Youth reviewed the scientific
literature on the subject of television violence and concluded that
"there is absolutely no doubt that higher levels of viewing violence
on television are correlated with increased acceptance of aggressive
attitudes and increased aggressive behavior."8 Some advocates of
a variation of this view rely less on scientific studies and more on
anecdotal evidence that video violence can inspire impressionable
viewers to imitate acts of violence.
29
(2) Cultivation. Proponents of this perspective argue that televi-
sion's influence on viewers is more pervasive than possible links to
discrete individual acts of violence. Instead, they argue that
television's effects operate on a much larger scale, shaping people's
social constructions of reality."0 In modern society:
Robert Posch, What You Do Emerges From Who You Are, DIRECT MARKETING MAG.,July
1993, at 43.28 Alison Bass, Report on Youth Violence Urges Prevention, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 10,
1993, at 1, 6; see also 1 COMMISSION ON VIOLENCE & YOUTH, AMERICAN PSYCHOL.
ASS'N, VIOLENCE & YOUTH: PSYCHOLOGY'S RESPONSE 33 (1993).
" In the case of"imitative" violence, viewers directly mimic violent acts portrayed
on television. See Prettyman & Hook, supra note 2, at 381; Andrew B. Sims, Tort
Liability for Physical Injuries Allegedly Resulting From Media Speech: A Comprehensive
First Amendment Approach, 34 ARIz. L. REv. 231, 243-45 (1992); see also Zamora v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199, 203 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (rejecting theory
that television violence was responsible for minor plaintiff becoming addicted and
desensitized to violent behavior resulting in his killing an 83-year-old woman). The
summer of 1993 saw several high-profile cases of this type of violence. In one, an
Ohio boy set his house on fire, killing his younger sister, allegedly after viewing an
episode of"Beavis and Butthead," an MTV cartoon in which the main characters play
with fire. See Richard Zoglin, The Shock of the Blue, TIME, Oct. 25, 1993, at 71.
" This theory was first developed by George Gerbner and his associates at the
University of Pennsylvania's Annenberg School for Communication. See Gerbner &
Gross, supra note 18, at 173, 178. Gerbner and his associates argue that:
[I]n contrast to the more usual statement of the problem, we do not believe
that the only critical correlate of television violence is to be found in the
stimulation of occasional individual aggression. The consequences of living
in a symbolic world ruled largely by violence may be much more far-
reaching.... TV violence is a dramatic demonstration of power which
communicates much about social norms and relationships, about goals and
means, about winners and losers, about the risks of life and the price for
transgressions of society's rules. Violence laden drama shows who gets away
with what, when, why, how and against whom. "Real world" victims as well
as violents may have to learn their roles. Fear-that historic instrument of
social control-may be an even more critical residue of a show of violence
than aggression. Expectation of violence or passivity in the face of injustice
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[T]elevision is the central cultural arm of American society. It is
an agency of the established order and as such serves primarily to
extend and maintain rather than to alter, threaten, or weaken
conventional conceptions, beliefs, and behaviors. Its chief cultural
function is to spread and stabilize social patterns, to cultivate not
change but resistance to change. Television is a medium of the
socialization of most people into standardized roles and behaviors.
Its function is, in a word, enculturation s l
Thus, television distorts viewers' perceptions of violence when
it portrays disproportionate levels of violence and aggression
compared to that in the real world. Violent programming cultivates
fear and anxiety in its audience. The problem is compounded when
the video diet is particularly violent and viewers are consuming such
output in large doses.
(3) Desensitization. Others object to television's depiction of
violence on the grounds that it desensitizes viewers to the negative
effects of aggression. Because of the volume and casual manner in
which television portrays violence, viewers are shielded from the
pain and suffering which accompany actual acts of violence.
"[T]here's a danger that a continuous diet of this sort of thing can
eventually make us insensitive and impervious to the genuine article
when we see it," warns one proponent of this view. 2 "'We're not
talking about eliminating violence from television,'" explains
Senator Paul Simon. "'We're talking about deglamorizing violence,
about portraying it realistically. The positive message needs to be
delivered that violence brings no pleasure." 33 Supporters of this
argument also accuse the news media of irresponsibility in their
reporting of crime stories, especially when reporters appear to
exploit a "sensational" angle of an event.3 4
may be consequences of even greater social concern.
Id.
31 Id. at 175.
39 Meg Greenfield, TV's True Violence, NEWSWEEK, June 21, 1993, at 72.
S Connell, supra note 4, at A8.
s See Steven Gorelick, Cosmology of Fear, MEDIA STUD.J., Winter 1992, at 17,24-25.
Gorelick argues that to alleviate the news media's tendency to manipulate the shock
value of violent crimes and to pander to audiences' urges for sensational explicit
stories, the press should be more sensational and more explicit, in order to educate the
public about the truly terrible nature of violent crimes:
[P]ull no punches, leave no doubts, forget the euphemisms. If body parts
are involved, tell us which body parts. Readers and viewers might be
offended by more detailed discussions of some crimes, but that's no excuse.
This does not mean that the Eyewitness Crew should pursue ever more
blood-soaked video for the 11 o'clock teaser; rather that journalists,
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(4) Ideology/Morality. Some critics argue that the prevalence of
violence in the media, especially in popular entertainment, sends
disturbing messages regarding the modem American experience:
[T]he message of such entertainment is not what the sociologists
say it is-that violence is an effective way to solve problems, that
human life is cheap. The message is that America is no longer the
land of promise, that fear and not opportunity drives us, that the
American dream is dead.35
In addition, some religious groups, such as the Amish, oppose
televised violence on moral grounds.
3 6
(5) Taste. Finally, at the other extreme, some viewers feel that
violence as a general matter is acceptable on television, but that
there is simply too much of it. These critics do not subscribe to, or
even care about, the scientific evidence on the subject. They simply
believe intuitively that there should be less violence on the air.
Although opposed to the exploitive uses of gratuitous violence,
many of these viewers shy away from the more extreme positions
outlined above because, frankly, they admit to enjoying violent
material, at least once in a while. As one critic concedes: "Person-
ally, I don't like the fact that there's so much [media violence] these
days, but boy, I love the movie 'Aliens,' especially the scene in which
Sigourney Weaver straps on that robotic forklift outfit and beats the
pulp out of the big alien wasp monster.
" 3T
B. Summary
As these abstracts indicate, participants in the television violence
debate differ widely in their notions of the exact effects of violence.
This fact helps to explain why people who can agree that violent
material is bad can still often disagree over the proper remedy to
whatever their medium, should explain the real horror of these crimes. I
think people want to know, and people need to know, even if they don't
want to. In other words, if you're going to be sensational, be responsibly
sensational. Be clear. Don't make the story palatable. The real story
usually isn't, and readers should know that.
Id. at 25.
5 Pat Dowell, The Nightmare Factory, IN THESE TIMES, Sept. 20, 1993, at 30, 31.
s See John A. Hostetler & Donald B. Kraybill, Hollywood Markets the Amish, in
IMAGE ETHIcs 220, 231 (Larry Gross et al. eds., 1988) (explaining that, from the
Amish perspective, "violence is always wrong, even if contrived and shown on the
screen for a noble purpose").
" Noel Holston, Censorship: Scary Stuff, In Opposing TV Violence, Some Ignore Full
Picture, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Nov. 3, 1993, at IE.
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the "problem" of televised violence-the nature of the "problem"
changes depending on which perspective a person brings to the
debate. A member of the desensitization camp, for example, might
be satisfied to see programs depict violent acts so long as the ugly
effects of those actions are presented with equal force. Such
portrayals would not satisfy direct cause-and-effect proponents who
believe violent material stimulates violent behavior no matter how
responsibly it might be presented.
In light of this disagreement between various critics of television
violence, communications policymakers should seek to find the
common ground uniting these categories by advocating policies
which aim to weaken industry reliance on violence as a convention
designed to draw audiences for advertisers. This approach would
increase the diversity of television programming in the hope that
increased viewer choice and producer creativity will lead to the
proliferation of responsible nonviolent programming. The creation
of an environment in which levels of violence are reduced and
viewers have greater choice in programming is a goal with which
everyone concerned with violence can be satisfied.
II. 1993: TELEVISION VIOLENCE TAKES CENTER STAGE
A. The Congressional Assault
The year 1993 marked significant changes in not only Congress's
attitude toward the need for legislative and administrative solutions
to the television violence problem, but also in the industry's
response to this latest round of attacks."8 One of the factors
responsible for raising the stakes in the 1993 violence debate was
the impending expiration of the Television Program Improvement
Act of 1990,"9 which granted television network executives a three-
year antitrust exemption for the purpose of "developing and
disseminating voluntary guidelines designed to alleviate the negative
's Apparently, public opinion toward television violence has changed as well.
According to a recent Times Mirror poll, the percentage of Americans who consider
television unduly violent rose from 49 to 72% during the past decade. See Harry F.
Waters et al., Networks Under the Gun, NEWSWEEK, July 12, 1993, at 64, 65. Another
survey, commissioned by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, reported that eight
out of 10 respondents believe television is too violent. See Nicole Carroll, Viewers
Speak: TV Airs Too Much Violence, USA TODAY, Feb. 1, 1994, at DI.
39 47 U.S.C. § 303c (Supp. III 1991). For an overview of the Act, see Julia W.
Schlegel, The Television Violence Act of 1990. A New Programfor Government Censorship?,
46 FED. COMM. L.J. 187, 193-95 (1993).
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impact of violence in telecast material."" As the end of the three-
year term approached, Senator Paul Simon, sponsor of the 1990
Act, convened a series of hearings to assess the industry's perfor-
mance under the Act. Even before the opening gavel sounded the
start of the first hearing, however, Simon and others made clear
their opinion that the industry had failed to take adequate advan-
tage of its opportunity to reduce the violent nature of television
voluntarily." In a historic Beverly Hills conference, Simon
addressed 650 television writers, producers, and promoters in the
most explicit terms: "Exercise some self-restraint or Congress will
do it for you-and many of my colleagues want to go much further
than is healthy for a free society."
42
Between May and September of 1993, legislators introduced
seven bills to deal with the problem of television violence: the
Television Violence Report Card Act of 1993, 43 the Children's
Television Violence Protection Act of 1993, 44 the Presidential
Commission on TV Violence and Children Act,45 the Parents
4' 47 U.S.C. § 303c(c).
41 See Kilday, supra note 3, at 6A ("'[W]e changed the anti-trust laws three years
ago to let the networks deal with this in their own way.... And they did nothing.'"
(quoting Rep.John Bryant of Texas)). But see Joyce Price, Congress'Nudging Reduces
Violence on Prime-Time TV, WASH. TIMES, July 29, 1993, at A6 (reporting statements
of Senator Simon and George Gerbner tentatively acknowledging success of
Television Violence Act of 1990 in reducing volume of violent material).
42 Connell, supra note 4, at A8.
43 H.R. 2159, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 973, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. This bill would
require the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to rate the amount of vio-
lence appearing in cable and broadcast television programs and produce quarterly
Television Violence Report Cards reporting the violence rating of specific programs
and identifying their sponsors. See H.R. 2159, supra, § 3(a); S. 973, supra, § 3(a).
Under this approach, its authors argue, the government does not limit what viewers
can watch, but instead "bolster[s] the ability of families and communities to make
these decisions themselves." H.R. 2159, supra, § 2; S. 973, supra, § 2.
44 S. 943, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. This bill would require the FCC to establish stan-
dards under which television licensees and cable programmers would be required to
run a video and audio warning as to the violent content of a program and its possible
negative effects on children. See id. § 3(a). Violations would be punishable by fines
of up to $25,000 and would be considered in the renewal application process of televi-
sion licensees. See id. § 4. News broadcasts, sporting events, educational program-
ming, and documentaries may be exempted from the advisory requirement at the
FCC's discretion. See id. § 5.
45 H.R. 2609, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. This bill would authorize formation of a com-
mission to study the problem of television violence, particularly its alleged adverse
effects on children, see id. §§ 3-4, and present a final report summarizing its findings
and presenting recommendations for "legislative, administrative, and voluntary
actions" which would counter the effects of television violence. Id. § 8. Additionally,
any recommendations should continue "to preserve our tradition of free expression."
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Television Empowerment Act of 1993,46 the Television and Radio
Program Violence Reduction Act of 1993,4" the Television Violence
Reduction Through Parental Empowerment Act of 1993,4" and a
bill sponsored by Senator Carl M. Levin of Michigan.
49
Although Congress failed to act on any of these bills during
1993, the mere introduction of these proposals established many
legislators' intent to break from the script of earlier brushes with
the television industry: this time lawmakers' threats of action
against violent programming were backed by concrete schemes to
regulate television content.
B. The Industry Reaction
More surprising than the increasingly credible threat of
government action was the industry's response. For the first time
in the history of the forty-year violence debate, members of the
television community acknowledged a responsibility for dealing with
the problem of violent material,5" even going so far as to agree to
Id. § 4.
46 H.R. 2756, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. This bill would establish a toll-free telephone
number for the collection of complaints, comments, and suggestions concerning
violence on broadcast and cable television. See id. Summaries of this information
would be published quarterly identifying the programs, stations and networks (broad-
cast and cable) prompting complaints. See id. § 3(b). Complaints concerning
individual stations would be forwarded to the appropriate licensee. See id. § 3(c).
During the summer of 1993, ABC established a private version of this bill through the
ABC Advisory Hotline, an "800" number providing callers with a recorded listing of
ABC programs carrying viewer advisories. The company received 4500 calls in its
first four days of operation. See Steve Coe, ABC to Viewers: Dial M for Murder,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 2, 1993, at 16; Ellen Edwards, Congress Takes Aim at
TV Violence: Bills Would Require "V-Chip, "Regulation of Fiction Programs, WASH. POST,
Aug. 5, 1993, at C1, C4.
47 H.R. 2837, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. This bill would "require the [FCC] to establish
standards to reduce the amount of programming which contains violence from
broadcast television and radio." Id. at 1.
48 H.R. 2888, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. This bill would require new television sets to
have built-in circuitry (known informally as the "V-chip") to allow viewers to block the
display of violent programming. See id. § 3. Broadcasters would have to run
advisories before violent shows in addition to transmitting electronic signals that
would trigger the V-chip in a receiver set to block violent programming. See id.
§ 2(a).
" S. 1556, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. This bill would require commercial broadcast
television stations to maintain public records of complaints regarding violent
commercials and program promotion advertisements.
" See Waters et al., supra note 38, at 64 ("[A]fter 40 years of denial, despite more
than 3,000 damning studies, the TV industry's biggest guns tacitly conceded that
violence on television can indeed beget violence in real life.").
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impose voluntary violence ratings systems on programming.5
Speaking in the wake of the Beverly Hills conference,52 CBS
programming chief Jeff Sagansky acknowledged that regardless of
one's opinion on the accuracy of the scientific research on the
effects of television violence, "[t]he fact of the matter is our society
has gotten more violent. No matter what you believe about the
studies, we've got to be part of the solution and in no way part of
the problem." 3 By the end of the summer, all four networks and
fifteen cable services agreed to transmit viewer advisories before
programs containing violent material.5 4
In addition to feeling the pressure from legislators, the networks
might have agreed to these conciliatory steps because of a sense of
growing public resistance to current levels of television violence. A
1993 Times Mirror poll found that fifty-nine percent of respondents
were "personally bothered" by television violence, and eighty
percent agreed that such violence is harmful to society.55 The very
"' See Edmund L. Andrews, Cable Industry Endorses Ratings and Devices to Lock Out
Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1994, at 1.
52 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
Greg Braxton, TV Industry Warned: Curb Violence or Congress Will, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 3, 1993, at DI, D5; see also Verne Gay, Television Violence: 500 Industry Executives
and Observers Gather in Hollywood to Discuss an Issue as Old as TV Itself, NEWSDAY, Aug.
1, 1993, at 7 ("'Clearly there is an awareness in this community that there is a
problem. Obviously, society is too violent and, without stating that TV is the
problem, it is certainly part of the problem.'" (quoting Leslie Moonves, President of
Warner Brothers Television)); David Levy, Guns, Sex and Network Secrets: The Plot by
TV Execs to Bring Mayhem to the Tube, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1993, at Cl. Levy states:
To some of us, the public fuss over violence on television seems awfully
familiar-and for good reason. Much the same fuss was made 30 years ago
by another collection of congressmen, facing another collection of network
executives. The difference is that in 1993, the chieftains of network TV are
at least admitting some of the blame. Thirty years ago, they stonewalled.
Id.
" See Verne Gay, Pulling the Plug on TV Chaos, NEWSDAY, Aug. 1, 1993, at 51; see
also Kim McAvoy, TV Industry to Senate: Self-Regulation, Not Legislation, the Answer to
Violence, BROADCASTING & CABLE, May 24, 1993, at 14 (reporting pledge of all three
major broadcast networks to reduce volume of violent programming for upcoming
season). Several months after agreeing to air voluntary advisories for violent
programming, however, at least one network announced that none of its new fall
series would be carrying a warning label. See Steve Coe, No Warnings for Fall Says
Saganshy, BROADCASTING & CABLE, July 26, 1993, at 20, 22 (reporting CBS's
announcement that none of its fall series warranted parental advisories, although
individual episodes might occasionally require warning labels).
55
TIMS MIRROR CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, TV VIOLENCE: MORE
OBJECTIONABLE IN ENTERTAINMENT THAN IN NEWSCASTS 19 (1993); see also
Christopher L. Phillips, Hollywood Takes Hill Heat on Violence, BROADCASTING &
CABLE,June 14, 1993, at 68 ("'I think people are frustrated about crime, and this is
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public antiviolence campaign led by Rev. Donald Wildmon and the
American Family Association against the controversial ABC show
NYPD Blue was probably the most tangible expression of the
sentiment measured in the polls.
5 6
The networks' official concessions as to the possible negative
societal effects of television violence, however, should not be read
as signaling a shift in the industry's fundamental opposition to
government intervention in television programming. Throughout
the 1993 debate, industry officials relentlessly refuted any call for
regulation with the traditional First Amendment refrain." Many
also pointed to the politically opportunistic nature of the assault on
television: "Nobody is going to lose points back home by going
after television violence," mused one network executive who asked
not to be identified.58 "It's like being against motherhood and
apple pie. It's a shorthand for 'Are you for violence or against it,'"
another unidentified executive added.5 9  Critics also pointed to
one way to deal with it.'" (quoting Jack Valenti, President of the Motion Picture
Association of America)).
" NYPD Blue was at the heart of the 1993 debate over television violence. The
ABC police series, which, by the producer's own admission was partly motivated to
push the edges of broadcast program standards, unleashed an angry anti-NYPD Blue
campaign headed by media watchdog Rev. Donald Wildmon. See Richard Zoglin,
Bochco Under Fire, TIME, Sept. 27, 1993, at 81. Fifty-seven ABC affiliates refused to
run the series premiere which included a "jarring" scene in which a major character
is shown being shot six times at close range. See Ed Bark, Cuffs Come Off "NYPD Blue"
Tonight, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 23, 1993, at IC. To counter the affiliate
defections, ABC began offering the series to independent and Fox network affiliates
in markets where the ABC affiliate had refused to air the show. See Greg Braxton,
"NYPD Blue" Nabs ABC Viewers Despite Preemptions, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1993, at F4.
Perhaps as a result of the controversy over its content (each episode is preceded
by a "viewer discretion is advised" warning), the show did remarkably well, garnering
critical acclaim, selling out advertising, and landing among the 15 highest-rated shows
each week. See id. at Fl, F9; see also Jefferson Graham, "WYPD" Makes Its Case: No
Ratings Blues for Controversial Series; Winning Over Affiliates and Viewers, USA TODAY,
Oct. 26, 1993, at 1D-2D ("'You can't buy the kind of PR Bochco got,' says Joel M.
Segal of the McCann Erickson advertising agency. 'When you flag a movie or book
as being titillating or violating somebody's standards, that draws 'em in. People
become curious.'").
5 See McAvoy, supra note 54, at 14 (reporting broadcast and cable officials
testimony to Senate panel expressing preference for self-regulation over congressional
action and unworkable ratings systems).
" Edwards, supra note 46, at C4; see also Feran, supra note 5, at 6A ("'TV Violence
has no constituency. If you are looking for a target that has no other side, you have
found it.'" (quoting ABC News Correspondent Jeff Greenfield)).
" Edwards, supra note 46, at C4. Actor Tom Selleck has also been outspoken on
this point, telling one reporter that it is 'scapegoating to point to Hollywood or the
news media or anybody else when really it rests with the individual and the
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what they saw as legislators' hypocritical reluctance to confront
more controversial, and arguably more direct, influences on
violence such as gun control.60
Some producers defended their work on the basis of market
forces in a video environment undergoing dramatic technological
changes. Indeed, competition from cable television, which is
distributed on a pay-per-view or pay-per-channel basis and is not
subject to the same FCC-enforced public interest standards as
broadcast stations, forces broadcasters to use increasingly explicit
material to capture the attention of viewers choosing from a
growing array of channel options.6 1 In defending his show, Steven
Bochco, producer of the controversial NYPD Blue, commented that
"[w]e have a new generation today .... What people watch is
significantly more adult because they can access so much more.
This show [NYPD Blue] gave us some additional colors to paint our
pictures."6" In sum, 1993 saw a dramatic rise in the intensity and
visibility of the television violence debate. Despite all the attention,
however, neither the industry nor legislators managed to reach a
consensus as to how to remedy the situation. In fact, defining the
problem at all continued to be a significant matter of disagreement.
C. What Is Violence? The Definition Debate
As with beauty, violence is in the eye of the beholder.
63
Television industry advocates consistently point out the difficult
questions raised in defining violence. For example, George
Gerbner's Violence Index study defines violence as "the overt
expression of physical force against self or other, compelling action
against one's will on pain of being hurt or killed, or actually hurting
individual's own sense of value and ethics." Canadians Adopt Code: Televised Violence
Continues as Front-Burner Issue in Washington, Elsewhere, COMM. DAILY, Nov. 9, 1993,
at 3 [hereinafter Canadians Adopt Code].
' See Thomas Tyrer, Q&A: Disney's Rich Frank, ELEC. MEDIA, Aug. 23, 1993, at
1, 17 ("1I am concerned when we have governmental bodies that want to take on
television violence but refuse to get AK-47s and Uzis and handguns off the streets.").
61 See Rob Dreher, Simonizing the Tube: Senator Calmly Set His Sights on Controlling
Violence on TV, WASH. TIMEs, Aug. 1, 1993, at D1 ("[I]n a severely competitive TV
market, cable violence ups the ante for broadcasters. Many in the TV business claim
original cable programming like horrormeister John Carpenter's "Body Bags" ...
stands to lure viewers away from relatively tame network fare.").
62 Zoglin, supra note 56, at 81.
Marc Gunther, TV Violence: Who Knows What Is, What Isn't?, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Nov. 1, 1993, at El, E6.
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or killing."' Critics have complained, however, that this definition
disregards the context or tone of an act.' For example, surveys of
television violence which characterize shows based solely on a
running tally of broadly defined violent acts may equate Bugs Bunny
tripping Elmer Fudd, a sack during a Monday Night Football game,
news footage of the Rodney King beating, and Rambo maiming yet
another anonymous victim.66 Some critics argue that the impact
on the viewer of violence will vary significantly depending on
whether the action occurs on a children's cartoon, a televised
sporting event, a news/documentary program, or an action/
adventure film, and they should not all be lumped together.6'
" Gerbner & Gross, supra note 18, at 184.
65 See Price, supra note 41, at A6 ("'NBC welcomes responsible studies of TV
violence,' NBC spokesmanJoe Rutledge told the Associated Press. 'This bizarre bit
of bean counting [the Gerbner Cultural Indicators Project] does not hold up to
scrutiny.'"); Jessica Seigel, Many Viewers Agree TV Violence Is Harmful; But in What
Context?, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 8, 1993, § 4, at 1.
"They [the researchers] kept using the word 'graphic.' I still don't
know what that means," said Christine Hikawa, vice president of standards
and practices for ABC. "When they compare Wile E. Coyote [from the
Road Runner cartoons] and 'I Spit on Your Grave,' [a movie in which a
woman is gang raped] they lose credibility with me."
Id. (alterations in original).
In response to the controversy over his measurement techniques, Gerbner readily
agrees that "[o]bviously, not all violence is alike," but that for the purposes of a
massive empirical coding study like the Violence Index project, subjective standards
are not possible, and the definition currently in use is a reliable and objective one.
See Gerbner et al., supra note 7, at 8. Gerbner adds that "continued squabbles about
technical methodological details of definition and measurement deflect attention from
more serious areas of agreement and consensus." Id.
Equating such disparate acts fails to account for the context in which the violent
acts occur. For the 1992-1993 season, the National Coalition Against Television
Violence "rated the lighthearted 'The Young IndianaJones Chronicles' as the most
violent show ... beating out grittier fare like 'Top Cops.' The group's system, based
on a strict count of violent acts, apparently failed to consider tone." Seigel, supra
note 65, § 4, at 1.
67 See, e.g., Price, supra note 41, at A6; Seigel, supra note 65, § 4, at 1. Indeed, the
debate over the effects of cartoon violence is particularly contentious because of the
possible impact on large audiences of children. Although the networks argue that
these programs are harmless compared to dramatic depictions of violence,
researchers such as Gerbner argue the opposite-that in fact because the violence is
"sugarcoated" in a comedic package, the effect on children is even greater. See Seigel,
supra note 65, § 4, at 1 ("'Humor makes it [violence] go down more easily.'" (quoting
George Gerbner of the University of Pennsylvania's Annenberg School for
Communication) (alteration in original)); see alsoJOHN CONDRY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
TELEVISION 89-91 (1989) (reviewing scientific research into effect of cartoon/comic
violence on children); Gay, supra note 53, at 7 ("[T]he hottest area of contention is
animation .... Some executives say the debate becomes ludicrous .... How can
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The definitional debate has serious implications for the
constitutionality of potential regulations as well as their practical
application.6" Regulations that define violence too broadly or
vaguely run the risk of chilling the protected speech of television
programmers."9 The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU")
publicly opposes legislators' efforts to regulate television content:
"'We have real problems with any attempt by government to curtail
ideas presented on television.... Under the Constitution, there's
no such thing as a dangerous idea, and the solution to speech that
bothers us is more speech of the kind that counters it. '"'
Apparently, if legislators are aware of the definitional dilemma
at all, their solution has been to avoid attempting to define what it
is they want to regulate. Of the bills introduced during 1993,1
only two include a definition of violent content.72 The remainder
either delegate this weighty task to the FCC,78 to the industry, 4
or avoid the issue of definition altogether.7
5
the watchdogs seriously criticize something as innocuous as 'Tom and'Jerry?' But
some experts say violence on cartoons is ... most pernicious of all because ... its
constant repetition trains children to perform violent acts.").
" On this point, civil liberty advocates and public interest attorneys share the
concerns of industry members. See Gunther, supra note 63, at E6 (reporting
definitional concerns of Arthur Kropp, President of People for the American Way,
and Andrew Jay Schwartzman, Executive Director of the Media Access Project).
69 See infra notes 77, 92-111 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional
implications of definitional debate).
7' Dreher, supra note 61, at D4 (quoting Robert Peck, a First Amendment
specialist for the American Civil Liberties Union).
71 See supra part II.A (discussing the bills introduced during 1993).
' See S. 943, supra note 44, § 2(1) ("The term 'violence' means any action that has
as an element the use or threatened use of physical force against the person of
another, or against one's self, with intent to cause bodily harm to such person or
one's self."); H.R. 2837, supra note 47, § 3(1) (same).
" See, e.g., H.R. 2159, supra note 43, § 3(c) (requiring the FCC to rate programs
and program sponsors).
71 See, e.g., H.R. 2888, supra note 48, § 2(8)-(10) (urging the industry to adopt the
use of devices such as channel-blocking equipment and rating systems).
' See, e.g., H.R. 2609, supra note 45; H.R. 2756, supra note 46; S. 1556, supra note
49. This Comment uses the term "television violence" generically to describe actions
falling under the Gerbner definition-with the caveat that all television violence might
not have the same impact depending on context and tone. As is discussed below, one
of the advantages of the strategies suggested in this Comment is that they generally
avoid having to define "violence." See infra part III.C.
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III. THE PROBLEM WITH CONTENT-BASED REGULATION
OF TELEVISION VIOLENCE
The difficulty in defining violence points to the serious problem
of the constitutionality of current efforts to curb violent material.
To date, the legislative response of choice to the violence dilemma
has been to propose legislation mandating special treatment (usually
in the form of labeling or public documentation) of violent
programming.76 This content-based approach, however, is misdi-
rected in terms of both the law and policy. Although the courts
might uphold the constitutionality of such direct regulation of
protected speech, labeling laws raise First Amendment and policy
concerns that cannot be ignored." Most importantly, the back-end
content-based approach of labeling holds only limited promise in
addressing the structural causes for the production of violent material.7
76 Of the seven bills mentioned in Part II.A, at least three, the Television Violence
Report Card Act, the Children's Television Violence Protection Act, and the
Television Violence Reduction Through Parental Empowerment Act, would require
either the FCC or other industry entities to rate programming for violence. See S.
973, supra note 43, § 3(a); S. 943, supra note 44, § 3(a); H.R. 2888, supra note 48, § 3.
A fourth bill, the Television and Radio Program Violence Reduction Act, which would
have the FCC establish standards to reduce the amount of violent broadcast
programming, presumably would also require the Commission to evaluate program
content for violence. See H.R. 2837, supra note 47, § 4(a).
' For general discussions of the constitutionality of television violence regulations,
see Albert, supra note 4, at 1317-44 (considering constitutionality of violence
regulation strategies, including monitoring of violent content through existing FCC
licensing mechanisms, application of the Fairness Doctrine to violent material, and
promotion of nonviolent programming); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe,Jr.,
Televised Violence: First Amendment Principles and Social Science Theoy, 64 VA. L. REV.
1123, 1261-96 (1978) (applying First Amendment principles to proposals to prohibit
violent material, balance violence, equip receivers to block violent programs, and
require warning advisories); Prettyman & Hook, supra note 2, at 366-79 (rejecting
application of "incitement" analysis to television violence); Emily Campbell,
Comment, Television Violence: Social Science vs. the Law, 10 LoY. ENT. L.J. 413,453-59
(1990) (discussing constitutional propriety of various government violence regulation
schemes).
' The government's role in the implementation of the rating scheme is critical.
A statute requiring the state to screen all programming for violent content obviously
raises the most serious First Amendment concerns, as outlined below. Even if the
power to decide which shows require labels were vested in an independent
nongovernmental body, however, as currently proposed by the cable and broadcast
industries, see Andrews, supra note 51, at 1, constitutional concerns might neverthe-
less persist. See Jane M. Friedman, The Motion Picture Rating System of 1968: A
Constitutional Analysis of Self-Regulation by the Film Industry, 73 CoLuM. L. REV. 185,
206-35 (1973) (arguing for possible application of prior restraint, First Amendment,
and Fourteenth Amendment doctrines to voluntary motion picture ratings system).
Given the intensive public and private pressure on the industry during 1993, a
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A. Labeling: Information or Restriction?
Initially, one must confront the question of whether labeling
statutes should be viewed as true content-based restrictions if the
purpose and effect of such regulation is only to provide information
to consumers, and not to prohibit expression. How a court
characterizes labeling will largely determine the analysis and
outcome of a constitutional review. 9 Two rationales for treating
labeling as a content-based regulation are apparent. The first is that
requiring a violence advisory from a programmer imposes a direct
penalty on expression. In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 0
the Supreme Court considered legislation requiring professional
fundraisers to disclose certain financial information to potential
donors." The Court argued that "[m]andating speech that a
speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of
the speech. We therefore consider the Act as a content-based
regulation of speech." 2
The Riley Court explicitly rejected the state's argument that a
disclosure requirement warrants less careful scrutiny than tradition-
al restrictions on expression. The Court stated: "There is certainly
some difference between compelled speech and compelled silence,
but in the context of protected speech, the difference is without
constitutional significance, for the First Amendment guarantees
'freedom of speech,' a term necessarily comprising the decision of
both what to say and what not to say."3
The second is that, although the lofty theoretical purpose of a
labeling statute is to provide information and empower viewers, 4
"voluntary" industry-initiated ratings system might not be entirely voluntary. Finally,
from a policy standpoint, allowing the industry to regulate violence on its own terms
through an independent system could be unwise because it enables the regulated
entity to establish standards that are far less restrictive than what Congress would
have passed, but not so permissive that legislators feel the need to intervene directly.
The result, for the public interest, might be the end of debate with quite unsatisfacto-
ry results.
' See infra parts III.B-C.
'o 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
sI See id. at 784-803.
82 Id. at 795.
8 Id. at 796-97; see also Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). In Talley, the
Court held as void on its face an ordinance restricting the distribution of any handbill
which failed to identify the name and address of its author or manufacturer. See id.
at 65. The Court stated that "[t]here can be no doubt that such an identification
requirement would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby
freedom of expression." Id. at 64.
84 See 139 CONG. REC. S5823 (daily ed. May 12, 1993) (statement of Sen.
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the practical consequence of such regulation might be to suppress
violent expression. Because advertisers generally avoid associating
with programming that is offensive or controversial, 5 the violence
label could become a stigma that effectively repels sponsors,
8 6
leading the networks and stations to avoid airing shows that have a
label or run the risk of receiving a label.
Furthermore, there is reason to doubt the truly "informational"
nature of the labeling statute. In examining the motion picture
industry's self-imposed rating system, one commentator questions
the scheme's practical informational value:
87
It appears that the rating system has stimulated ... many forms of
extra-industry private censorship that simply could not occur in
the absence of the X and R [ratings]. Under the rating system,
personal and institutional judgment and criticism on a movie-by-
movie basis are no longer necessary. Any motion picture rated X,
regardless of its merit or social value, has been branded in the
minds of many as obscene.
88
For example, she argues, many newspapers refuse to carry advertise-
ments for X-rated films, despite having run ads for similarly erotic
films before the implementation of the rating system.89 Likewise,
television networks, airlines, and hotels have refrained from
exhibiting films branded with the X and sometimes even the R
rating.
90
Durenberger) (describing labeling bill as empowering measure designed to help
consumers, particularly parents, make informed viewing choices); see also David
Durenberger, I See No Reason We Should Not Warn Parents About the Harmful Effects
That TV Violence May Have on Their Children, BROADCASTING & CABLE, May 31, 1993,
at 74 ("Warning about violent TV shows will help us keep this marketplace free and
vigorous by increasing the information available to parents about the TV shows their
children might see.").
85 "One of the basic commandments of advertising is: 'Thou Shalt Not Offend.'
An advertiser does not want to spend money to make enemies." Campbell, supra
note 77, at 461 (footnote omitted).
' Initially, for example, advertisers shied away from ABC's controversial NYPD
Blue, which had a warning label, because it contained explicit language, sexual
situations, and violence. See Zoglin, supra note 56, at 81 (reporting a "wait-and-see"
attitude on the part of advertisers towards the show). Even after the show proved
itself as a ratings contender, mainstream advertisers, many ofwhom maintain specific
content guidelines, refused to purchase time with the show. See Graham, supra note
56, at ID, 2D.
87 See Friedman, supra note 78, at 202-06.
s Id. at 202 (citation omitted).
s9 See id.
90 See id. at 203-04.
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Labeling for television violence might have the same effect. An
FCC violence rating procedure could displace the personal
judgment of viewers who simply decide not to watch (or not to let
their children watch) any program with a label. In the event a
rating system were combined with the implementation of a
technological V-chip program, which automatically blocks out shows
carrying a violence label, this substitution of the FCC's program
judgment for personal program judgment would be completely
automatic. Thus, the practical effect of this system would be to
censor programming based on its content, not merely to provide
information.
9 1
Alternatively, a court could take the position that labeling
performs an informational, rather than a restrictive, function. From
this perspective, labeling acts as a means for the government to
increase the information available to consumers, enabling them to
make better-educated program decisions. The fact that viewers use
that information to avoid undesirable violent programs does not
necessarily force the characterization that labeling is restrictive.
Rather, the public should be able to choose what it wants to
watch-and labeling simply aids individuals in those choices.
The characterization of labeling as restriction of information is
likely to be the key issue in a court's constitutional analysis. As
demonstrated below, that characterization will likely determine
whether a labeling statute passes or fails constitutional muster.
B. Labels as Content-Based
To a court adopting the view that labeling requirements are
content-based restrictions, First Amendment analysis would
continue under the highest level of judicial analysis-strict scruti-
ny. 92  To pass constitutional muster, the government entity
91 These practical effects fall within the scope of traditional First Amendment
analysis:
[T]he fact that no direct restraint or punishment is imposed upon speech
or assembly does not determine the free speech question. Under some
circumstances, indirect "discouragements" undoubtedly have the same
coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights as imprison-
ment, fines, injunctions, or taxes. A requirement that adherents of
particular religious faiths or political parties wear identifying arm-bands, for
example, is obviously of this nature.
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950).
W See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 509
(1991) (applying strict scrutiny to content-based "Son of Sam" law); Sable Communica-
tions, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("[To] regulate the content of constitu-
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offering the restriction must show that the legislation is necessary
to fulfill a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to serve
that interest without impacting other speech protected by the First
Amendment.93 The outcome of this analysis often hinges on
whether the speech at issue falls into one of several categories of
subordinate expression that are not entitled to full First Amend-
ment protection. 4 In general, while the courts have allowed
significant state restrictions on subordinate classes of speech,
restrictions on protected expression must meet extremely strict
standards to pass constitutional muster.
9 5
Because television violence clearly falls outside the traditional
categories of subordinate speech,96 under a rudimentary applica-
tionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling state interest [the
government must] choose[] the least restrictive means to further the articulated
interest."); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(requiring strict scrutiny in context of "public forums"); see also LAWRENCE TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-3, at 798-99 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing
application of strict scrutiny analysis).
93 See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126; Peny, 460 U.S. at 45.
' The Court has held that a number of classes of expression are entitled to
limited or no First Amendment protection. See e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964) (defamatory speech); Posadas de P.R. Ass'n v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S.
328 (1986) (commercial speech); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (same); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words).
95 See e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (stating principle of
"equality of status in field of ideas" which prevents government from restricting
expression based on content of that expression). The Court's disdain for content-
based legislation surfaced most recently in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538
(1992), which considered a city ordinance prohibiting bias-motivated symbolic speech.
In striking down the ordinance, the Court articulated the principle that "[c]ontent-
based regulations are presumptively invalid," even if applied within categories of
speech traditionally held to be outside the protection of the First Amendment. Id.
at 2542. In an especially controversial portion of his opinion,Justice Scalia explained
that these categories of speech (such as defamation and obscenity) are not literally
outside of the Constitution, but rather are permissibly regulated "because of their
constitutionally proscribable content." Id. at 2543. Thus, St. Paul's attempt to restrict
certain specific species of hate speech was immediately suspect despite the fact that
the ordinance sought to punish a subclass of speech (fighting words) historically
considered to be unprotected. See id. at 2543 ("Thus, the government may proscribe
libel; but it may not make the further content discrimination of proscribing only libel
critical of the government.").
' The Seventh Circuit has held, for example, that
Racial bigotry, anti-semitism, violence on television, reporters' biases-these
and many more influence the culture and shape our socialization. None is
directly answerable by more speech, unless that speech too finds its place
in the popular culture. Yet all is protected as speech, however insidious.
Any other answer leaves the government in control of all of the institutions
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tion of strict scrutiny analysis it appears a court could invalidate a
labeling statute on the basis that it unconstitutionally restricts
protected expression. Given the ongoing controversy over the
precise effects of media violence and the problem of definition, the
government would face a tough battle in demonstrating both its
compelling interest and the required fit between means and ends.
9 7
Under a strict scrutiny analysis, a labeling statute might arguably
be saved by the fact that the expression involved falls within the
broadcast context, an area in which the Court has repeatedly held
that the special circumstances of the medium justify content-based
restrictions.9 8 In particular, the Court has relied on the technolog-
of culture, the great censor and director of which thoughts are good for us.
American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 1985), affd, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986).
The only class of subordinate speech in which violent television content could
arguably fall would be expression which incites violence. This position is tenuous,
however, in light of the difficulty of proving television executives' intent to incite
violence and the conflicting evidence linking television violence with tangible acts of
real world violence. For a convincing rejection of the application of the Brandenburg
"imminent lawless action" standard, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969), to media violence, see Prettyman & Hook, supra note 2, at 374-79. In Winters
v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), the Court considered a challenge to a state statute
prohibiting the distribution of printed materials consisting primarily of criminal acts
or accounts. See id. at 508-10. The antiviolence statute had been used against a
bookdealer charged with intent to sell the magazine Headquarters Detective, True Stories
from the Police Blotter. See id. at 508. Unfortunately, the Court did not reach First
Amendment principles in the case, choosing instead to strike down the statute on
Fourteenth Amendment void-for-vagueness grounds. See id. at 518-19.
" See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 77, at 1134-70 (presenting detailed
criticism of social science evidence and definitional problem as inadequate foundation
for government regulation). The authors conclude:
In sum, we do not believe that the available evidence concerning the impact
of televised violence on society can or should lead one to conclude that any
foreseeable regulatory program designed to inhibit or channel violent pro-
gramming would be worth the costs of its implementation or could be
supported by any acceptable view of rational policy formulation.
Id. at 1170. But see Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 11 F.3d 170, 185 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (Edwards, J., concurring) (suggesting that empirical evidence of harmful
effects of television violence is quite persuasive compared to the lack of evidence of
harms related to indecent programming).
" See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943)
(upholding FCC authority to license broadcasters and regulate networks through
chain broadcasting rules); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-01
(1969) (upholding constitutionality of Fairness Doctrine); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, 748-51 (1978) (upholding FCC authority to restrict the broadcast of
indecent language); see also Communications Act of 1934, § 301, 47 U.S.C. § 301
(1988) (granting FCC authority to regulate communications in the name of"public
interest, convenience or necessity"); Richard B. Gallagher, First Amendment Guaranty
"VIEWER DISCRETION IS ADVISED"
ical scarcity of the broadcast spectrum as ajustification for allowing
the government to regulate broadcasting.99 In FCC v. Pacrfica
Foundation,"0 the Court, by a five-to-four vote and on a slightly
different rationale, upheld the Commission's authority to regulate
indecent broadcast-radio programming to protect the interests of
children. Specifically, the Court cited two factors justifying the
restriction of indecency to hours when children are unlikely to be
members of the listening audience: (1) the uniquely pervasive
presence of the broadcast media in daily American life; (2) the easy
access of children to broadcast materials.01  Because of the
government's legitimate interest and statutory duty to regulate
television content in the public interest, Pacifica tentatively suggests
the constitutionality of labeling for violence.
Outweighing this factor, however, is the impact the definitional
debate would have on the courts' analysis of the means-ends fit of
a labeling regulation. On November 23, 1993, in the heat of the
1993 television violence debate, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit handed down the latest installment in
a continuing five-year battle between the court and the FCC relating
of Free Speech and Press as Applied to Licensing and Regulation of Broadcast Media-
Supreme Court Cases, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1110, § 2(a) (1982) (discussing the unique
characteristics justifying special application of First Amendment principles in
broadcasting).
" The government's authority to regulate mass communication industries has
come under increasing attack because of growing doubt over the scarcity rationale as
a legitimate means for justifying regulation of the airwaves. With the advent of
alternative technologies of mass communication, including cable, direct broadcast
satellite, and fiber optic networks, many commentators have argued that the
government can no longer justify regulating broadcasters to insure diversity in the
communications industry. See e.g., David L. Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the
Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213, 223-29; Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L.
Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEx. L. REV. 207, 221-26
(1982); MurrayJ. Rossini, The Spectrum Scarcity Doctrine: A Constitutional Anachronism,
39 Sw. L.J. 827, 827-38 (1985); Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing
Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 990, 1007-20 (1989);Jill A. Stern et al., The New Video
Marketplace and the Search for a Coherent Regulatoiy Philosophy, 32 CATH. U. L. REV.
529,562-66(1983). Without the scarcity argument, the Court will certainly scrutinize
the constitutionality of a labeling statute under a much more demanding standard
than possible under the current regulatory framework. The District of Columbia
Circuit has already approved the FCC's rejection of the scarcity rationale. See
Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 661-64 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1019 (1990). More importantly, in FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S.
364 (1983), the Supreme Court openly invited the FCC and Congress to argue that
the scarcity doctrine is now obsolete. See id. at 376 n.11.
'0 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
101 See id. at 748-50.
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to various attempts to regulate broadcast indecency. In Action for
Children's Television v. FCC,112 the D.C. Circuit invalidated a six
a.m. to midnight ban on indecent material.'0 3 Despite its finding
that the government's objectives of "helping parents supervise their
children," "protecting the well-being of vulnerable youth," and
"shielding them from physical and psychological abuse" were
"compelling,"0 4 the court held that the government's eighteen-
hour indecency ban was not "the least restrictive means to advance
its interests in the protection of children."'0 5 Specifically, the
court cited (1) the lack of evidencejustifying the choice of the hours
between midnight and six a.m. as appropriate in assisting parents'
supervision of their children's exposure to indecent material;
0
6
(2) the government's failure to consider that its interest in prevent-
ing all minors from exposure to indecent material might be
11 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1993) [hereinafter ACT 111].
103 See id. at 182-83 (invalidating the Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102-356, 106 Stat. 949). The Public Telecommunications Act also contained
a special provision extending the safe harbor to 10 p.m. for public broadcasters who
sign off the air before midnight. See § 16(a), 106 Stat. at 954. In two previous
decisions, the D.C. Circuit struck down earlier attempts by the FCC and Congress to
enforce measures channeling or prohibiting broadcast indecency. In Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988) [hereinafter ACT I],
vacated, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the D.C. Circuit struck down an FCC decision
to shorten the "safe harbor" in which stations could permissibly broadcast indecent
material. See id. at 1341 (overruling In re Pacifica Found., Inc., 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 932
(1987)). The shift in administrative policy to a midnight to six a.m. safe harbor, the
court held, was unjustified by the agency record. See id.
Following ACT I, Congress entered the fray, passing an appropriations rider
ordering the Commission to enforce a 24-hour ban on indecent broadcasting. See
Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608, 102 Stat. 2186, 2228 (1988). In Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991) [hereinafter ACT II], cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1281 (1992), the D.C. Circuit rejected the ban, holding that not even
Congress could ban indecent speech without providing for some sort of safe harbor
period. See id. at 1509. The court directed the FCC to resume the rule making
proceeding it had begun after the ACTL See id. at 1510. These issues included, inter
alia, the extent of the government's interest in restricting broadcast indecency and the
proper guidelines andjustifications for determining the proper safe harbor period for
children. See id.
Even before the FCC could begin to gather the information the court requested,
Congress intervened once again, passing the legislation which precipitated ACT IL
See § 16(a), 106 Stat. at 949 (requiring the FCC to promulgate a new rule barring
indecent material during the broadcast hours from six a.m. to midnight).
1 4ACT III, 11 F.3d at 177.
15 Id. The court continued: "[W]e conclude that the government did not
properly weigh viewers' and listeners' First Amendment rights when balancing the
competing interests in determining the widest safe harbor period consistent with the
protection of children." Id.1
06 See id.
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outweighed by the First Amendment rights of older, mature
children to view such material;.. 7 and (3) the government's failure
to balance the rights of adult audience viewers against the compel-
ling interest in protecting children.
08
Together, the D.C. Circuit's decisions relating to the regulation
of broadcast indecency and its repeated insistence on complete
evidentiary records supporting the specific details of indecency
regulations demonstrate the high level of scrutiny that content-based
regulation of protected speech faces in the courts. 1°9 The D.C.
Circuit's struggle to evaluate the fit between ends and means in
attempts to regulate indecency would likely prove even more
difficult in the violence context. Because of the diversity of theories
on the effects of violence on viewers"0 and the related problem
of defining "violence,""' Congress and the courts will be hard-
pressed to discover the "least restrictive means" of protecting
viewers from violent content without at the same time chilling other
speech. Without greater agreement on what the "problem" of
television violence actually is, legislators face a nearly impossible
task in trying to regulate in a manner the courts will accept.
C. Labeling as Information
A court deciding that violence labeling is properly characterized
as informational would likely reach a different result. Because of
the informational nature of label requirements, a court might
choose not to view the regulation under traditional content-based
strict scrutiny analysis, but instead treat it simply as a rule requiring
programmers to disclose information beneficial to consumers." 2
107 See id. at 178-80.
"03 See id. at 181-82. The court opined that "[w]hat [the government] should have
been aiming at was a time when the risk of child viewing was low and yet adult
viewers could exercise a meaningful choice to view the material while still awake."
Id. at 182.
109 For instance, in ACT III, the court ruled that "[t]he government must adduce
data which permits a more finely tuned trade-off between adults' First Amendment
rights and the government's interest in protecting children from indecent material
as that interest varies in importance with their age." Id. at 180.
... See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text (summarizing various classes of
objections to television violence).
.. See supra part I.C.
112 The government's disclosure requirements with respect to cigarettes, see 15
U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), and food and drug labels, see 21 U.S.C.
§ 352 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), are perhaps the most well-known examples of this type
of regulation.
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Under such analysis, the likelihood of labeling statutes passing
constitutional muster is quite high. In Meese v. Keene,13 the Court
considered the constitutionality of the Foreign Agents Registration
Act of 1938,"4 which required that certain foreign films designated
as "political propaganda" be labeled as such when exhibited in the
United States."' The district court held the statute to be an
unconstitutional abridgement of speech, primarily because of the
public's likely negative response to the label "political propa-
ganda."
116
The Supreme Court, however, rejected this analysis, arguing
instead that the labeling requirement imposed no restriction on
speech" 7 and that exhibitors' proper response to possible sup-
pressing effects of labeling should be countered with additional
speech:
Congress simply required the disseminators of such material to
make additional disclosures that would better enable the public to
evaluate the import of the propaganda. The statute does not
prohibit appellee from advising his audience that the films have
not been officially censured in any way. Disseminators of
propaganda may go beyond the disclosures required by statute and
add any further information they think germane to the public's
viewing of the materials. By compelling some disclosure of
information and permitting more, the Act's approach recognizes
that the best remedy for misleading or inaccurate speech con-
tained within materials subject to the Act is fair, truthful, and
accurate speech.1
1 8
The same "counter-speech" reasoning could apply to a violence
label statute viewed from the informational perspective. Television
networks and stations fearing the deterrent effect of broadly worded
labels could expand its advisories to include specific explanations of
the type and amount of violence in a show. The additional
I's 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
114 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
,,5 See 481 U.S. at 470-71.
16 See Keene v. Meese, 619 F. Supp. 1111, 1123-26 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (reasoning
that requirement of "political propaganda" label reflected "a conscious attempt to
place a whole category of materials beyond the pale of legitimate discourse"), rev'd,
481 U.S. 465 (1987).
117 See 481 U.S. at 480 ("Congress did not prohibit, edit, or restrain the
distribution of advocacy materials in an ostensible effort to protect the public from
conversion, confusion, or deceit.").
"8 Id. at 480-81 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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information could soften the blow of a generic warning require-
ment.
For a court choosing to view labeling as informational, the
Supreme Court's decision in Meese and the Court's special treatment
of the broadcast television context make for a compelling argument
for the constitutionality of advisory-type regulations. Even so, this
type of response to the problem of television violence raises First
Amendment concerns which, even if they fail to invalidate such
statutes altogether, are weighty enough that policymakers should
search earnestly for alternative means of restricting television
violence.
Most importantly, the problem of definition must and will
pervade the constitutional analysis of any attempt to regulate violent
material. The dangers of vagueness and overbreadth abound in the
violence context, especially in light of the continuing debate over
how violent programming impacts on audiences. If the FCC
adopted a technical definition, such as the one used in the Violence
Index studies," 9 opponents could argue that the definition sweeps
too much into the violent category because it fails to account for the
effect of context. If the FCC tried to describe the contextual
elements that make violence harmful and warrant labeling, critics
will point to the standard as unconstitutionally vague because it fails
to give programmers adequate guidance as to what material war-
rants a rating and what does not. The result, critics would argue,
is a chilling effect as producers avoid even skirting the government's
ambiguous standard.
In sum, the constitutionality of warning requirements is unclear
and depends largely on whether the courts characterize such
statutes as informational or restrictive. Although cases such as Riley
v. National Federation of the Blind,2" and Talley v. California'
strongly suggest the determination that violence labeling are
properly characterized as inappropriate state restrictions, Meese
could provide support for the view of labeling as permissible
informational intervention. Even if the statutes overcome the First
Amendment hurdles related to labeling, however, the requirements
may also be objectionable from a pure policy perspective.
"
9 See Gerbner et al., supra note 7, at 6.
120 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
121 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
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D. Policy Considerations
The policy objection to labeling statutes and other regulations
which censor content is that these proposals fail to address the
structural motivations for the proliferation of violent material.
Instead, these proposals take a reactive stance to the problem in the
hope that punishing violent output will deter its production.
Labeling measures, for example, apply pressure on only one aspect
of the structure by seeking to influence those advertisers concerned
with avoiding controversial material.'22 This approach has no effect
on breaking the structural chain of other market, occupational,
organizational, and legal influences that drive the creation of violent
content. 123 Networks will continue to order, and producers will
continue to produce, violent materials as long as markets for them
exist. In fact, the use of a label might actually increase the product's
market value because of its potential to attract viewers interested in
violent programming." 4 Labeling requirements enforced in the
domestic market are also unlikely to affect distributors' ability or
incentive to continue to sell programs in international markets when
labeling is not required.
Another problem with labeling, V-chip, or other so-called
"parental empowerment" legislation is that such proposals require
affirmative action on the part of parents and guardians to supervise
children's viewing. If parents or guardians are unwilling or unable
to play such an active role in monitoring their children's television
habits, 125 these measures are rendered ineffective while imposing
i22 Recent events, however, indicate the limited impact of this approach. Consider
the experience of ABC's television show NYPD Blue. Despite the controversy
surrounding the explicit sexual content and language in its premiere, see supra note
56, the show sold out all advertising during its first month. See Braxton, supra note
56, at F4, F9.
'2' The only structural impact labeling promises is to drive some advertisers from
violent programming. The impact of this effect on actual program content is
questionable. See Schlegel, supra note 39, at 214 (criticizingV-chip proposals because
"a technical device is unlikely to address the central concerns of those who believe
televised violence is a social ill, because lock boxes do not generate a reduction (or
elimination) of televised violence").
124 See Waters et al., supra note 38, at 64 ("The advisories are just a faster road
map to the violent material .... 'Kids channel surfing will stop immediately and say,
"Hey, this is it! We don't even have to look for it."'" (quoting Terry Rakolta,
Founder of Americans for Responsible Television)). It has been suggested that
broadcasters could use labeling requirements as an excuse to show even more violent
programming since, after all, viewers are being warned about the content. See id.
" See Schlegel, supra note 39, at 214 ("[P]arents might be unwilling or unable to
supervise their children's television viewing even if the means to do so were readily
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serious free speech costs. The labeling approaches also assume that
children are the only viewers affected by violent programs. Many
opponents to television violence, including members of the
cultivation and desensitization camps, argue that adults are also
subject to the detrimental effects of such material.12
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE PRODUCTION PROCESS
To develop effective strategies for reducing violence and
increasing the diversity of television programming, policymakers
need to understand the program production process and the
reasons why it consistently creates so much unimaginative and
violent material. Reactive measures such as content-based legisla-
tion fail to recognize the complex interaction of forces at play in the
television production process. The examination of the television
production process set out below stems from a structural analysis of
the industry.
A. The Production of Culture
The "production of culture" perspective diverges radically from
our romantic image of art as the product of the lone starving artist
wielding a pen or paintbrush and toiling long hours by candlelight
to bring her work to fruition.127 Today, mass produced works of
art spring from complex industrial processes which often bring
together hundreds of individuals, large corporate entities, legal
constructs, organizational rules and conventions, and a myriad of
other influences. 28  In contrast to the romanticized artist who
exercises complete control over her product from start to finish, the
creator of a television program is subject to a dizzying array of
influences-so much so that it is difficult to identify any single
individual as the "artist" responsible for a show. Instead, a
television program is the product of -the collective effort of what
Howard Becker has termed an "art world":
available."); see also Campbell, supra note 77, at 455 (pointing out that warning labels
are ineffective with viewers who tune in late to a program and miss the advisory).
12 See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text (discussing the cultivation and
desensitization theories).
1
27 See HOWARD S. BECKER, ART WORLDS 1 (1982).
12' See id.; see also Richard A. Peterson, Five Constraints on the Production of Culture:
Law, Technology, Market, Organizational Structure and Occupational Careers, 16 J.
POPULAR CULTURE 143 (1982).
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Art worlds consist of all the people whose activities are
necessary to the production of the characteristic works which that
world, and perhaps others as well, define as art. Members of art
worlds coordinate the activities by which work is produced by
referring to a body of conventional understandings embodied in
common practice and in frequently used artifacts. The same
people often cooperate repeatedly, even routinely, in similar ways
to produce similar works, so that we can think of an art world as
an established network of cooperative links among partici-
pants.1
29
Becker's art world model provides an uncannily accurate
description of the television programming process, where programs
are indeed the product of many individuals behaving according to
well-established conventions and expectations.
130
Similarly, Richard A. Peterson describes the production of
culture perspective as one recognizing that "the nature and content
of symbolic products are shaped by the social, legal and economic
milieux in which they are produced.""3 ' In particular, Peterson
identifies five constraints which are useful in dissecting the web of
influences affecting the production of culture: law, technology, the
market, organizational structure, and occupational careers.1
3 2
Each of these constraints can operate either individually or in
conjunction with others depending on the particular production
process involved.1
1 3
In the realm of television, for example, the legal constraints of
the FCC and copyright law both constrain television output.13
129 BECKER, supra note 127, at 34-35.
'SO See HerbertJ. Gans, Popular Culture in America: Social Problem in a Mass Society
or Social Asset in a Pluralist Society?, in SOCIAL PROBLEMS: A MODERN APPROACH 549,
553 (Howard S. Becker ed., 1966). Gans summarizes his criticism of popular culture
into three parts:
[M]ass culture is an industry organized for profit; ... in order for this
industry to be profitable, it must create a homogeneous and standardized
product that appeals to a mass audience; and that this requires a process in
which the industry transforms the creator into a worker on a mass
production assembly line, where he gives up the individual expression of his
own skills and values.
Id.
13 Peterson, supra note 128, at 143.
132 See id.
133 See id.
1s4 For example, the FCC regulates the broadcasting of lottery information,
obscenity, and profanity, see 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1211, 73.4165 (1992), and the Copyright
Act of 1976 limits the secondary transmission of copyrighted material, see 17 U.S.C.
§§ 111, 118-119 (1988).
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Likewise, the market forces of advertisers; the organizational
structure of the networks and production studios; and the occupa-
tional roles of individual producers, network executives, and
program directors have an enormous impact on what is shown on
television. 35
B. Money Talks: The Dual Market and Network Control
I'm not interested in culture. I'm not interested in pro-social values. I
have only one interest. That's whether people watch the program. That's
my definition of good, that's my definition of bad.'
3 6
Television is a business. From this perspective, the sentiments of
network executives such as the one cited above make perfect sense.
The number one priority in television is not to transmit quality
programming to viewers, but to deliver consumers to advertis-
ers.' Yet, despite the single-minded drive for profit that steers
this business, the industry is plagued by a remarkable feeling of
uncertainty about what exactly draws viewers. Unlike traditional
industries in which goods or services are distributed to a single
market, the television industry operates within the framework of a
dual product market.' On one level, members of the television
art world deliver shows (goods/services) to viewers (consumers) in
the context of a program product market. 9 In this market,
producers expend their creative efforts trying to develop programs
that people will enjoy enough to make time to watch.140 Success
... See infra parts IV.B-F (describing the universe of influences on the program
production process).
136TODD GITLIN, INSIDE PRIME TIME 31 (1985) (quoting Arnold Becker, Vice
President for Television Research, CBS).
13
7 
See MURIEL CANTOR, THE HOLLYWOOD TV PRODUCER: His WORK AND His
AUDIENCE 64 (2d ed. 1988). Cantor argues:
The decision-making process in the television industry has to be
understood in the general construct of commercial television. The main
function of the entertainment programs generally is to attract large
audiences in order to sell products; therefore, if a show does not attract a
large enough audience, it often will be dropped. The advertiser wants a
certain number of viewers for his money; in fact, the "cost per thousand"
viewers often determines whether the advertiser will stay with a show. The
number of viewers usually is determined by the Nielsen ratings.
Id. The same is becoming more and more true in the news context as well. See
Richard C. Wald, The News Marketplace: A Ride on the Truth Machine, GANNETT
CENTERJ., Spring 1987, at 7, 16-19.
138 See ROBERT G. PICARD, MEDIA ECONOMICS: CONCEPTS AND ISSUES 17 (1989).
139 See id.
140 See id.
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in this market is gauged primarily through viewership measures such
as the Nielsen ratings.
141
In the broadcast context, however, this program product market
is illusory in the sense that viewers do not pay for the programs they
receive from broadcasters. 142  Because of broadcast television's
status as a public good,143 viewers do not directly provide revenues
for the industry. Therefore, performance in this market does not
necessarily benefit industry members financially.
The second market in which the television industry participates
is a related but conceptually separate advertising market where
industry members attempt to deliver audiences to advertisers.'4
These advertisers provide the bulk of industry revenues through
their purchases of advertising time.
145
To compete in this market, industry members cater to adver-
tisers' desires to reach certain segments of society whose characteris-
tics such as age, sex, and income make them especially attractive as
potential consumers. 46  Because broadcasters typically rely on
advertising dollars as their primary source of revenue, programmers
must tailor shows to meet advertisers' needs. 47 In fact, network
141 See BROWN, supra note 2, at 393 (describing the Nielsen Company as "a
company whose best-known service is the measurement of TV audiences and whose
reports are recognized as the index to success or failure in TV programming").
14,2 The cable or pay-service context obviously presents a different situation since
viewers pay a fee to receive a program.
145 See PICARD, supra note 138, at 18. A public good is one which users can
consume without diminishing its availability for others. See id.
144 See id.
141 See id. (explaining that "[a]lthough some observers may casually conclude that
media sell space or time to purchasers of advertising, a more precise and descriptive
explanation is that media sell access to audiences to advertisers").
' See CANTOR, supra note 137, at xxi (describing how network television targets
"middle and especially the lower-middle economic strata in society (presumably those
likely to use the everyday products such as the drugs, beauty aids, food and
household items advertised), and there is no doubt that this large group is made up
of most of the heavy viewers of primetime shows").
14' Gitlin argues that
[i]f prime-time TV seems senseless, that may be because we view it through
the prism of old-fashioned standards. We may expect loveliness of
language, expressive acting, shadings of performance, and intimations of
depths rumbling beneath the surface. We import ideals of craft and quality
from ages of artisanship, even from the teleplays of the fifties. And indeed
craft and quality do survive, at least as ideals, among Hollywood's craftsmen
and -women. The networks, though, have a prior objective. Although
executives may not be allergic to what they deem quality, the networks as
a whole aim to create not purposeful or coherent or true or beautiful shows,
but audiences. Any other purpose is subordinated to the larger design of
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executives might alter elements of a show to increase its appeal to
a particularly valuable audience. For example, Quinn Martin,
acclaimed producer of such shows as The Untouchables, The Fugitive,
and BarnabyJones, once described the process by which a character
killed in the pilot for a new series was written back into the story
after "somebody" (presumably a network or studio representative)
discovered the character's popularity with viewers during audience
research testing:
Well, in the pilot that I wrote with the writer, we used a seven-
foot black man who had a kind of Cuisinart for a hand. It could
make drinks, cut through things, really a gimmick, a very Bondian
gimmick. That man was killed in the pilot ....
But the black man tested very highly .... Somebody says,
"That black guy with the hand tested so high, make him the good
guy's assistant." ...
... There again, there's a decision made, pure and simple.
The meter said the black man tests well. Bring him back. Stick
him somewhere. No thought given to it, and everybody falls in
line. That's just one of the areas that really disgusted me with
television. They just put the money in their pocket and aren't
thinking through what they're doing. The show will fail. 4 '
In terms of the Peterson framework,' 49 then, the influence of
keeping a sufficient number of people tuned in. That is, after all, what
advertisers pay for. That is why the shows so often look concocted, forced,
to critics trained to spot internal niceties. The sophistication goes not so
much into shows as into calculations about audience "flow" and composi-
tion.
GrIUN, supra note 136, at 56. Advertisers exert similar influence over news
programming. See Gary Cummings, The Watershed in Local TV News, GANNETT
CENTERJ., Spring 1987, at 40, 51 (chronicling development of narrowcasting in local
news to meet advertisers need for discrete audiences).
The critical importance of ratings demographics is particularly evident in the way
program producers market their shows. Trade press advertisements for programs,
in contrast to advertisements directed at viewers, rarely tout shows' plot lines or even
star characters. Rather, typical trade press ads usually appear more like a spreadsheet
and list shows' ratings performances in "key target [demographics]." See BROADCAST-
INC & CABLE, July 26, 1993, at 8-9, 11-15, 28-29 (containing examples of industry
program series advertisements).
148 HORACE NEWCOMB & ROBERT S. ALLEY, THE PRODUCER'S MEDIUM: CONVERSA-
TIONS WITH CREATORS OF AMERICAN TV 68 (1983). The influence of advertising on
media content is equally troubling in the news context. See Bazelon, supra note 99,
at 229-34 (discussing negative impact of advertising and business interests generally
on broadcast news judgment).
' See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
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the dual product market environment framework is both a market
and an organizational constraint. In the course of adapting to the
changing demands of viewers and advertisers, the networks have
developed routines and conventions to adjust their shows to the
vagaries of market demand and increasing competition among
themselves.' 50 The extensive use of Nielsen ratings, focus groups,
and other audience research, such as the pilot testing alluded to in
the Quinn Martin example above, are examples of empirical devices
the networks have devised to measure performance and demand.
In the face of an ever increasing number of video outlets, such as
expanding cable, satellite, and interactive television systems,
programmers are seeking more reliable and precise measures with
which to capture smaller, more fragmented segments of the viewing
audience. 151
Communications researcher Todd Gitlin describes this reliance
on the numbers as the "logic of rationalization." 5 ' In an industry
where the turnover of shows is rapid'53 and the cost of programs
'50 For an extensive discussion of empirical and nonempirical methods of research
and program analysis in electronic mass media industries, see ROGER D. WIMMER &
JOSEPH R. DOMINICK, MASS MEDIA RESEARCH: AN INTRODUCTION 280-309 (3d ed.
1991). See also GrrLIN, supra note 136, at 48 ("Indeed, the 'overnights' were the fruit
of a technology Nielson would probably not have developed had competition-crazed
networks not created a market for it.").
For a historical perspective on the rise of network control and rationalization, see
Thomas Schatz, Desilu, I Love Lucy, and the Rise of Network TV, in MAKING
TELEVISION: AUTHORSHIP AND THE PRODUCTION PROCESS 117 (RobertJ. Thompson
& Gary Burns eds., 1990) [hereinafter MAKING TELEVISION]. Schatz argues that
[b]y the mid-1960s, the networks had a lock on TV programming and
Hollywood's "creative community," from the studio powers to the struggling
independents, were relegated to mere subcontractor status. TV's penetra-
tion was well over 90 percent of American households, and network
executives coined terms like "least objectionable programming" and "lowest
common denominator" in their tireless efforts to maximize audience shares
and revenues. Not surprisingly, programming strategies grew increasingly
conservative and predictable as the experimentation and innovation of the
1950s gave way to standard operating procedure.
Id. at 132-33.
15 See WIMMER & DOMINICK, supra note 150, at 300 ("'[I]n the modern world,
where the business environment is hyper-competitive, and where the consumer
choices are increasing almost exponentially daily, it is no longer wise to base even
relatively minor decisions on either experience or intuition.'" (quotingJim Ehrhorn,
Operations Manager of WSBA-AM in York, Pennsylvania)).
" GrrLIN, supra note 136, at 32.
'5 Network executives displayed their skittishness earlier than usual in the 1993-
1994 season. ABC pulled its new comedy series The Paula Poundstone Show off the air
after only two episodes; South of Sunset, a CBS private-eye drama featuring rock singer
Glen Frey, premiered and ended in one episode. See Jonathan Storm, Now You See
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is high,154 uncertainty runs rampant and members desperately
hunt for ways to predict a show's success before they pour hundreds
of thousands of dollars into its production. "This pyramid of uncer-
tainty produces a paradox: The networks place a premium on
rationality, searching for seemingly systematic, impersonal, reliable
ways to predict success and failure."
155
However reassuring such conventions might be to marketers of
television content, their actual value in practice is quite limited.
First, the empirical research has severe limitations in its use in
market applications. 56 Second, despite the glut of numbers-
oriented research available to them, programmers continue to rely
on their intuition and experience in making decisions about shows.
"'Most research confirms what most broadcasters already know.
However, with the inherent risks in our business, research can
become yet another crutch to ease the weight of decision making.
Many broadcasters abuse the process by utilizing it to hide from
reality and make fuzzier the lines of responsibility. '" 15 7 Indeed,
one commentator argues that executives frequently use testing as a
strategic tool to reinforce already existing conventions and
intuitions:
The tool has its uses. When it confirms what some executives
already think, the test amounts to an argument with a special aura,
conferring the gloss of facts and figures on hunches and guesses.
As Harold Wilensky points out about executives in general, "They
throw in their 'research' staff ritualistically, much as a tribal
leader, embarking on a war, calls on the shaman for supporting
incantation."
158
Them, Now You Don't, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 21, 1993, at HI.
154 For the 1991-1992 season, the average production cost of a half-hour filmed
series was $950,000, up more than 12% from the previous season. See Steve Coe,
Production Deficits Top $464 Million, BROADCASTING & CABLE,June 8, 1992, at 4. The
average production cost for half-hour taped shows rose 37% in the 1991-1992 season
to a whopping $959,000. See id.
155 GITLIN, supra note 136, at 31.
" See id. at 49-55 (discussing flaws in representativeness in Nielsen ratings and the
industry's misuse of statistical audience analyses).
157 WIMMER & DOMINICK, supra note 150, at 300 (quoting Steve Berger, President,
Nationwide Communications Inc.).
'Is GITLIN, supra note 136, at 44. Gitlin describes how producers will sometimes
intentionally include an exciting opening scene in a pilot to excite test audiences and
thereby skew the overall results in favor of the show. See id. at 45. Low ratings can
also give network executives a convenient excuse to cut a show, "thereby deflecting
some of the suppliers' anger onto the hapless research department." Id.
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In the final analysis, decision-making in the program selection
process remains highly subjective. The television industry operates
under a startling atmosphere of uncertainty and ignorance: the
reality is that television is "a business that offers so little firm
grounding in ethics, aesthetics, or rationality."1 59 As a result,
much of what television decision-makers do is a grand attempt to
find, or even create, islands of rationality and reliability in an ever-
shifting sea of uncertainty.
C. Making Television: The Producer's Medium
Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify a single
author or artist responsible for a television show, the production
process includes a number of key players. To facilitate an under-
standing of how shows are developed, an examination should begin
with the individuals most responsible for what appears on television
screens every night-the television producers.
160
The job description for producers reveals the wide range of
creative ability, people skills, and technical talent necessary to fill
the role:
[The producer is the] person in charge of a TV production, who
establishes the working spirit and dictates the standards to be met.
Ideally, as head of the creative team, the producer is both
businessman and artist, caring about administration and budgetary
details while nurturing the talent and providing the vision for the
project.
61
'
5 9 Id. at 22.
0 This organization in the medium of television differs from the film context
where directors wield the greatest authority over a project. See CANTOR, supra note
137, at 8. One unfortunate limitation of focusing on entertainment producers is that
it restricts the scope of the inquiry to dramatic series, comedies, and other fictional
programs. To compensate for this shortcoming, throughout the following discussion,
as well as throughout this Comment, cross-references to news and other nonfiction
programming are included where applicable.
161 LEs BROWN, THE NEW YORK TIMES ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TELEVISION 342 (1977).
Robert and Maxine Reed offer a similar, although more comprehensive, informaljob
description in The Encyclopedia of Television, Cable, and Video:
This title is one of the most overused in the television industry. Many
claim it, often on a temporary basis. A true producer, however, is the
overall manager of an individual television production and the person who
conceives and develops ideas for programs.... A producer is usually a
skilled professional who may generate a series of shows, a single program,
or a segment of a larger project. Most commercial and [public television]
(PTV) stations employ full-time producers. The responsibilities of the
position include the development of ideas and scripts, and the selection of
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In terms of their day-to-day duties, producers are responsible for
the principal features of the production process, including story
selection; the hiring of writers, directors, cast, and other staff; and
overseeing the final editing of the show.112 Although no individu-
al ever wields exclusive power over any program, the producer's role
is probably the most influential in terms of creative and business
control.1 6 Indeed, consistent with the descriptions above, indus-
try insiders often refer to television as the "the producer's medi-
um."
1- 4
Despite their apparent position of authority in the production
process, producers are subject to many constraining pressures and
demands. In The Hollywood TV Producer: His Work and His Audience,
an intensive sociological study of Hollywood television producers,
Muriel Cantor illustrates how these particular members of the art
world stand at the vortex of the production process and must
surrender their individual creativity and control to other interests:
[B]ecause the producer is part of a large, complex bureaucratic
organization, he does not have complete control. He is a working
producer-a man in the middle between those above him in the
networks and production companies and those he supervises in the
production crew. As a representative of management, he must
fulfill the goals of the organization. Ideally, the producer has
responsibility for the creative aspects of the show, but this is
always delegated authority because even when a man owns, creates,
and produces his own show, the network retains the right tofinal
approval of scripts, casts, and other creative and administrative
performers and directors. Producers also determine the specific approach
and format of each production.
They must keep programs within budget and on schedule, handle
clearances, order technical facilities and equipment, and schedule rehearsals.
Producers are also responsible for the contracts with performers, the
coordination of production assignments, and the supervision of directors.
ROBERT M. REED & MAXINE K. REED, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TELEVISION, CABLE, AND
VIDEO 434 (1992).
162 
See CHARLES R. WRIGHT, MASS COMMUNICATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPEC-
TIVE 67 (1986) (discussing CANTOR, supra note 137).
1 See id. (describing the television producer as a powerful force in television from
a creative and executive standpoint).
164 NEWCOMB & ALLEY, supra note 148, at 57; see also CANTOR, supra note 137, at
112 ("Television is seen as a producer's medium, as feature films are a director's
medium, because the producer is the final arbiter of controversies and is the one
person responsible for those decisions about the unexpected that must be made
quickly.").
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matters.
165
Producers face the conflicting pressures and interests of writers,
directors, actors, and actresses,'6 6 as well as the regulations of
various organized labor groups, 16 7 television pressure/activist
groups, 168 audiences, 69 and the networks. 7  Of these, the net-
works exercise the greatest influence over program content.
1 71
Although other art world members constrain producers' autonomy,
they do so in terms of the "craft" aspects of the production
process. 72  The conflicts between producers and their fellow
professionals in production center around relatively discrete issues
of quality and creativity; in contrast, producers' relationships with
the networks typically involve larger issues of the political and
artistic freedom to present certain ideas in a show. 73  These
limitations are a direct result of the networks' profit-motivated
influence on production. As previously noted,7 4 the networks
retain the final say on most production matters. Thus, the conflicts
that arise in the producer-network context are instrumental in
explaining the industry's reliance on violence as a visual convention.
D. The Domestic and International Markets for Violence
Within the context of the search for rationality, violence plays
a critical role because of its time-worn use as a means for capturing
the attention of viewers. In his history of television, Tube of Plenty:
The Evolution of American Television, Erik Barnouw traces the
165 CANTOR, supra note 137, at 8-9.
"6 See id. at 91-115 (analyzing the relationship of the producer with others-
writers, directors, and actors-who are also working in the craft aspect of production).
167 These labor groups include the Writers Guild and the Screen Actors Guild.
See id. at 95-105 (explaining how guild regulations concerning scriptwriting and screen
credits can determine whether producers rewrite scripts).
16 See id. at 34-37 (describing producers' vulnerability to attacks on controversial
content from pressure groups).
169 See id. at 164-87 (examining how the producer's perception of the viewing
audience affects content selection).
170 See id. at 116-43 (describing clash of bureaucratic network values with
producers' professional interests).
171 See Albert, supra note 4, at 1310-11 (explaining how political pressures led a
1977 House subcommittee to reject a controversial report placing the blame for
television violence primarily in the hands of the networks).
'7 See CANTOR, supra note 137, at 91 (explaining the dichotomy between the craft
aspect and the business aspect of production).
17 See id. at 113 (stating that "[t]he major complaint about producing was the lack
of political and artistic freedom").
1'74 See supra text accompanying notes 160-65.
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development of this convention to the origins of the medium in the
late 1950s. 175 At that time, the newly formed Writers Guild of
America West 176 "tabulated the announced needs of producers
and made it clear that hero-villain drama was about all that was
wanted."171 Most notably, these formula dramas almost always
included a final chase scene
in which [the villain] was subdued by fistfight, gunplay, knife
battle, lariat strike, karate action, or secret weapon.... There
seemed to be an unspoken premise that evil men must always, in
the end, be forcefully subdued by a hero; that the normal
processes of justice were inadequate, needing supplementary
individual heroism.
178
This initial enthusiasm for violent drama was reinforced by
subsequent ratings successes. In particular, the ABC network, which
was struggling to compete with NBC and CBS at the time, found
violent programs such as The Untouchables, Cheyenne, and The Rebel
to be an effective means to steal ratings points from the competi-
tion.179 The response from the competitors came swiftly in the
form of orders from executives to network foot soldiers to create
their own action telefilms:1
8 0
The ABC-TV concentration on action, which later became
known in government circles as the "Treyz trend," was rivaled at
CBS-TV by an "Aubrey dictum." Aubrey demanded action but
wanted girls to be a part of it. One staff member summarized the
dictum as "broads, bosoms, and fun." NBC apparently dared not
leave the field to its rivals and this led, according to later govern-
ment studies, to a "Kintner edict."'
175 See ERIK BARNOUW, TUBE OF PLENTY: THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN
TELEvIsION 215-16 (1975) (explaining that telefilms in the late 1950s provided violent
hero-villain conflicts in quantity).
17 The Writers Guild of America, the union representing more than 10,000
writers in television, radio and film, consists of two units, Writers Guild of America
West ("WGAW") and Writers Guild of America East ("WGAE"). See BROWN, supra
note 2, at 474.
"7 BARNouw, supra note 175, at 215.178 Id.
1' See id. at 261 (noting that most of ABC's rating successes were violent).
'80 See id. at 261-65.
"8 Id. at 264 (Treyz, Aubrey, and Kintner were presidents of ABC, CBS, and NBC
respectively); see also Levy, supra note 53, at Cl. Levy, a former NBC executive in
charge of network programming, resigned from the network in 1961 in protest over
the "Kintner edict" and the network's attempt to cover up the policy of adding sex
and violence to its programming. Later that year, Levy testified extensively before
the Senate subcommittee onjuvenile delinquency regarding the "Kintner edict." The
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Further fueling the drive toward violence was the development
of foreign broadcasting systems, and hence foreign markets for
American programming. Because the U.S. television production
system developed so early and enjoyed such extensive economies of
scale compared to other countries' systems, the "evolution of
American involvement with television abroad can be understood
within the concept of Americans offering, at an acceptable price,
what would be substantially more costly to do locally." 8 2 As early
as 1958, the advertising agency of Foote, Cone & Belding was
monitoring the development of potential foreign markets as
countries began purchasing American telefilms in small handfuls to
support fledgling broadcasting systems hungry for program-
ming.1 s3 Less than two decades later, in 1978, a Finnish research-
er could identify only five countries with television systems that
were not carrying any U.S. programming.
8 4
The immediate obstacle facing American entries into these
markets, of course, was the language barrier. Although dubbing
and subtitling operations and techniques proliferated to meet the
new demand, foreign distributors, namely the television networks
and major film companies, took advantage of the uniquely universal
language of action/violence.8 5 While comedies or news program-
testimony, which was taken behind closed doors, was never publicly released. Kintner
apparently was never asked about the policy during his testimony before the same
committee. See id. at C4.
182 WILLIAM H. READ, AMERICA'S MASS MEDIA MERCHANTS 90 (1976); see also Coco
Fusco, Telepictures: An Interview with Josh Elbaum, in GLOBAL TELEVISION 35, 39
(Cynthia Schneider & Brian Wallis eds., 1988). Fusco quotes Josh Elbaum, an
international sales executive for Telepictures, a domestic and foreign distribution
company:
"I want to mention that the primary reason why companies like this exist is
that we offer foreign stations, particularly in the Third World, in underde-
veloped countries, materials which if they were to make on their own would
cost substantially more money. Local production is outrageously more
expensive. For a country like Jamaica to be able to finance the production
of ten hours of local programming is simply out of the question. That's the
real reason we exist."
Id.
1a3 See BARNOUW, supra note 175, at 230.
184 See READ, supra note 182, at 23 (listing Mainland China, North Korea, North
Vietnam, Albania, and Mongolia as the five countries). "In effect, any U.S. TV show
preserved on film is a potential export and nearly every such program is available for
a price from a distributor." Id. at 24. Although outside the scope of this Comment,
the problem of U.S. dominance of the international video market also raises
interesting protests of cultural imperialism. See generally GLOBAL TELEVISION, supra
note 182.
185 See BARNOUW supra note 175, at 231; READ, supra note 182, at 71 (describing
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ming often presume some familiarity with American culture or
current events, action dramas require no such knowledge."8 6
"Climactic gun battles or fist fights, following a chase up a fire
escape or down a canyon.., conveyed their meaning readily in any
city or hamlet on the globe," explains Barnouw.1 7  Indeed, in
1972 the estimated weekly world audience for the NBC hit western
Bonanza was 350 million viewers.1
88
Today, satellite technology has raised the potential for profit
enormously through a phenomenon known as "sequential market-
ing," through which a single program or film is marketed in the
international market first to individual theaters, then cable and
satellite systems, then videocassette distributors, and finally public
broadcasters:
189
In terms of the new technology, you can do one trip, speak to
one company, and the show's on in thirty million houses. Before,
you had to go to all of the outlets to make things available to those
thirty million people. That's a lot of time, and a lot of money.
The new technology gives an additional source to sell things
to.
190
action-adventure programs as "the most saleable American programs abroad").
'8 See BARNOUW, supra note 175, at 231 (noting that while some comedy series
were "international successes, series emphasizing action rather than dialogue were far
more translatable").
' See id. Barnouw notes that
[b]y 1958-59 a television writer could scarcely find a market for any other
kind of material. That winter's Television Market List, issued for its members
by [Writers Guild of America West], listed 103 series, of which 69 were in
the action-crime-mystery category. They were peopled by cowboys,
policemen, and detectives whose terse words would issue in many languages
from the screens of the world.
Id.; see alsoJonathan D. Tankel, Program Production for Export and the Domestic Market:
Authorship in The Avengers, in MAKING TELEVISION, supra note 150, at 81, 83-84.
Tankel discusses the "mid-Atlantic series format" for creating a program suitable for
the international market:
"The formula is well known. It must be on film so that print copies are
available. Picture quality and definition must be [good], story structure
modified to include the maximum number of action sequences-thus
partially surmounting the language barrier. Story content must be reduced
to a simple contest between good and bad, instantly recognizable and
unequivocal in resolution."
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting British television writer Eric Paice).
"s See READ, supra note 182, at 24.
189 See Fusco, supra note 182, at 38.
190 Id.
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Most recently, the networks have added a new avenue of access
to international markets through the direct purchase of foreign
broadcasting systems.'9 ' As international markets continue to
expand, the incentive to produce easily translatable violent
programming is likely to increase.
9 2
E. Socialization of Network Standards
Within the logic of rationalization, it is no surprise that the
convention of violence born in the infant years of the industry and
reinforced by domestic and international market forces continues
today. 9 ' With the passage of time, however, a new concern is that
members of the art world (most importantly the producers, writers
191 See Richard W. Stevenson, Foreign Horizons Lure U.S. Broadcast Networks, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1993, at DI (reporting on U.S. broadcast networks' increased
involvement in overseas television markets).
19 At the same time, however, recent developments in the international scene
indicate some foreign governments' willingness to censor violent televised material
and restrict the importation of American violence. For example, at the end of 1993,
Canadian broadcasters and regulators agreed on a set of "voluntary" regulations that
restrict the presentation of televised violence. See Canadians Adopt Code, supra note
59, at 3 (noting that the Canadian regulations ban "any depiction of gratuitous
violence").
Overseas, both France and Spain recently imposed limits on foreign music and
movies. See Roger Cohen, France and Spain Impose Quotas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1993,
at C15 (reporting French Senate's approval of law requiring radio stations to play a
minimum of 40% French music, and Spanish Parliament's passage of restrictions on
dubbing and exhibition of American motion pictures); see also John Bates & Alan
Citron, Hollywood Left Out of Picture in Costly Blow, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1993, at Al
(reporting impact of negotiators' failure to include entertainment industry in General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). For a discussion of earlier European Community
restrictions on the importation of cultural products, seeJon Filipek, "Culture Quotas":
The Trade Controversy over the European Community s Broadcasting Directive, 28 STAN.J.
INT'L L. 323, 325 (1992) (discussing European Community's limitation of member
states' importation of foreign television programming); Suzanne M. Schwarz,
Television Without Frontiers?, 16 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 351, 357-62 (1991)
(explaining origins of European Community's "Television Without Frontiers"
Directive, and its desire "to protect Europe's cultural identity from the onslaught of
Hollywood programs" and to correct the U.S. entertainment trade surplus with
Europe).
19 For a discussion of how format and formula constrain American television
content, see Ann Swidler et al., Format and Formula in Prime-Time TV, in MEDIA,
AUDIENCE, AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 324, 335 (Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach & Muriel G.
Cantor eds., 1986) (describing how the need to sell advertising in the American
system fosters reliance on regularly scheduled serials that inhibit creativity and
diversity in programming). The authors argue that "for American television, the
commitment to continuing series and serials has restricted the ways television can use
the traditional formulaic resources of the culture." Id.
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and other craft members who are primarily concerned with product
quality) have internalized this convention as a norm of the produc-
tion process.
Various researchers have identified the phenomenon of the
"socialization of work""9 4 in the context of mass media journal-
ists. 5 Under this model, product policies, standards, and expec-
tations are communicated to members of an art world largely
through the informal process of on-the-job socialization. For
example, in the newsroom context, reporters are more likely to
learn the organization's news philosophy from indirect experience
than formal directives or training: "Professional journalists, like
their consumers, are educated by what they observe in their own
medium. A new reporter seeing what kind of stories get on page
one with bylines or are aired during prime-time news does not have
to be told what 'news' is for that particular organization."
19 6
Within the complex structure of a production process, with
many layers of decision-making, members of an art world learn to
censor their creativity to conform to the expectations of those above
them in the chain. John Ryan and Richard Peterson have described
this type of behavior within the framework of "the product
image." 9 ' Production artists, under this theory, "shape a piece of
work so that it is most likely to be accepted by decision makers at
the next link in the chain.""9 8 In Ryan and Peterson's framework,
the notion of the "product image," rather than the common
aesthetic of an art world, or the directive of an entrepreneur, drives
the production process and its final output.'99 Of course, the
tendency in such a system is the production of "works that are much
' For an overview of this concept, see WRIGHT, supra note 162, at 73-83.
"' See Ben H. Bagdikian, Professional Personnel and Organizational Structure in the
Mass Media, in MASS COMMUNICATION RESEARCH: MAJOR ISSUES AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS 122-42 (W. Phillips Davison & Frederick T.C. Yu eds., 1974); Warren
Breed, Social Control in the Newsroom: A Functional Analysis, 33 Soc. FORCES 326, 326-
35 (1955).
196 Bagdikian, supra note 195, at 122-23.
"7 John Ryan & Richard A. Peterson, The Product Image: The Fate of Creativity in
Countiy Music Songwriting, in INDIVIDUALS IN MASS MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS:
CREATIVITY AND CONSTRAINT 11, 24-25 (James S. Ettema & D. Charles Whitney eds.,
1982). Ryan and Peterson offer the product image framework as an alternative to the
traditional assembly line, craft and entrepreneurship, convention and formula, and
audience image and conflict models. See id.
'9s Id. at 25.
1'9 Although this model does not require the common set of conventions or values
presumed in Becker's art world model, repeated use of product images can lead to
the development of established norms much like those found in art worlds.
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like the products that have most recently passed through all the
links in the decision chain to become commercially successful."
2
1
0
In the television environment, this theory suggests a rationale for
the persistent creation of violent content, even without explicit
network orders.
Indeed, evidence of the socialization of product expectations
among producers is found in studies of television producers.
Cantor confirms that, much as in any other mass communication
process, "[tio remain in production, a producer must be able to
conform to the changing directives of the networks." 201  More
importantly, Cantor and others have found that producers, who
presumably are ultimately responsible for delivering programs to
the viewing audience, evaluate their products in terms of the
product image framework described above,20 2 that is, will the
networks and advertisers approve of this show?
[S]ome television producers may be communicating to the
secondary audiences (reference groups)-those in control of the
medium, the network executives and advertising agencies-rather
than directly to the primary viewing audience. Each network does
maintain script control and has an office that censors scripts. A
producer may learn policy and what is expected of him and select
stories accordingly after a number of his scripts have been
changed by the censor's office.
203
In light of the networks' historical reliance on (and approval of)
violence as a device to garner ratings, it is not surprising to find
producers have submerged their own aesthetic values in favor of the
prevailing product image.
20 4
200 Ryan & Peterson, supra note 197, at 25.
201 CANTOR, supra note 137, at 149.
212 See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
20 CANTOR, supra note 137, at 31.
204 Cantor points out that
[t]hose producers who are committed to particular artistic and ethical values
have trouble remaining in the commercial field. A well-known producer of
a series presently on the air left the field of children's programming because
he could not reconcile what he considered the networks' lack of social
conscience with his own ideas of good craftsmanship and content.
However, he is an exception.
Id. at 149.
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F. Summary
The production of culture is a complex process involving the
intersection of institutions, occupations, laws, technology, and
market forces. In addition, cultural products are shaped by the
conventions that prevail in a particular art world. In theory,
producers are the artisans that enjoy authority in overseeing the
craft and business aspects of television production. These individu-
als, however, are subject to great pressure from the networks, which
in turn must deal with both domestic and international market
pressures driving the business side of the industry. Because the
structure of the industry favors the pursuit of ratings and audience
shares for advertisers over the presentation of beneficial program-
ming, those associated with the "craft" aspects of production
compromise or even suppress their natural notions of quality.
The structure of television, then, produces a self-perpetuating.
cycle that maintains the status quo through the use of conventions
and rationalization. Homogeneous, unimaginative, and oftentimes
violent programming is the natural product of this cycle. Breaking
this cycle is the key to reducing violent content and encouraging
new forms of video expression. The following Part will suggest ways
policymakers can develop a comprehensive structural strategy to do
just that.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Does Violence Sell?
One of the more puzzling mysteries viewers face is why critically
acclaimed programming fails to generate the same ratings as
conventionally "less serious" shows." 5 Although the networks'
... Consider the case of Frank's Place, a sitcom that premiered in the fall of 1987
and featured the life of an African-American history professor who inherits a New
Orleans restaurant. The show, which starred Tim Reid (of WKRP in Cincinnati fame),
won praise from a diverse range of sources: critics declared the show "revolutionary,"
.a sitcom of uncommon freshness... a 'black' show of uncommon dignity," "the first
black show since Roots to take Black culture seriously." Richard Campbell &Jimmie
L. Reeves, Television Authors: The Case of Hugh Wilson, in MAKING TELEVISION, supra
note 150, at 3, 4 (quoting Michael Pollan, a writer for Channels magazine, and Alvin
Poussaint, the Harvard psychiatrist who consulted on The Cosby Show). The trade
publication Electronic Media ranked Frank's Place the third best show of 1987, behind
LA. Law and The Wonder Years. See id. Nevertheless, CBS canceled the show in
October 1988, barely more than a year after its debut. See id. Despite a strong start
in the ratings, by the end of the show's run, Frank's Place fell among the lowest rated
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impatience with poorly rated shows20 6 partially explains the
disappointing performance of some innovative nonviolent programs,
the larger question remains: do viewers prefer violence? The
answer to this question is critical to the policy debate on this issue.
If viewers want violence, then there really isn't much to debate-the
public is getting what it wants. If, however, audiences actually
prefer more diverse, nonviolent programming, then the oversupply
of violence is an indication of market failure in the industry-viewers
are getting lots of what they don't want-and structural changes are
in order.
The limited amount of empirical studies testing this point
indicate that in fact violence is not the pied piper that industry
executives have assumed it to be.2 °7 A study of more than 200
prime-time network dramatic shows aired between 1988 and 1993
revealed that violent programs consistently garner lower ratings
than nonviolent fare. 20 ' An earlier investigation examined the
relationship between violent programming and viewer satisfaction
through two independent studies: one testing the correlation
between the violence levels and Nielsen ratings of actual programs
and the other comparing laboratory subjects' reactions to either an
uncut version of a violent program or an edited nonviolent version
of the same program.20 9  Both studies failed to demonstrate a
correlation between violent content and popularity with viewers.
Although the explanatory power of such studies is obviously
limited, 210 such evidence tentatively suggests that the restriction
network shows on the air. See id.
Even Senator Simon has conceded his frustration with a viewing audience that
is "a little inconsistent." Feran, supra note 5, at 6A. "The audience says there is too
much violence, and at the same time they turn on the set and watch the violence."
Id.
206 See Storm, supra note 153, at HI (stating that programmers are often forced
to cancel poorly rated shows quickly in an era when network television is competing
with cable, independent stations, video games, and VCRs).2
1
7 See Gerbner et al., supra note 7, at 171; see also Ed Diener & Darlene DeFour,
Does Television Violence Enhance Program Popularity?, 36 J. PERSONALrTY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 333,339 (1978) (reporting experimental findings suggesting"that program
violence has little impact upon popularity and liking").
208 See George Gerbner, Highlights of the Television Profile No. 16, at 2-3 (Jan. 27,
1994) (unpublished manuscript presented at the National Association of Television
Program Executives' Annual Conference, Miami Beach, Fla.) (on file with author).
The average Nielsen rating for violent programs was 11.1, see id. at 3, while that for
nonviolent programming was 13.8. See id. Ratings represent the percentage of
households in a given area that are equipped with a television and are tuned to a
certain program. See BROWN, supra note 2, at 449.
'-o See Diener & DeFour, supra note 207, at 333.
210 See id. at 336-37, 339-40 (acknowledging criticism of Nielsen ratings as a
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of program choice, not natural preferences, is what leads viewers to
tune into violent programming: "A viewer would have to be quite
diligent to select nonviolent programs. Heavy viewers would have
the least choice."2 ' Another study of viewer preferences suggests
that violence is only part of a larger public dissatisfaction with low-
quality, homogenous program options.212  The solution the
researchers recommend parallels that suggested in this Comment:
Low level and homogenous programming are much more difficult
problems to solve than objectionable content. Rather than mere
reduction of specific subject matter, they require structural change
.... Ironically, only structural changes can truly resolve consum-
er complaints about content. Content complaints basically stem
from insufficient program variety. This means that at any given
time viewers with different tastes and needs are all forced to
choose from a few very similar programs.
213
The research thus supports the strategy of increasing program
choice, rather than the regulation of existing content, as a response
to the issue of television violence.
Faced with the choice between violent material and violent
material, then, viewers not surprisingly reach for what is available.
Greater diversity in program selection combined with more precise
measures of viewer preference could lead program executives to
reformulate their assumptions about what people want to see.
21 4
measure of viewer reaction to content and limitation of laboratory testing involving
only a single program).
211 Nancy Signorielli, Selective Television Viewing: A Limited Possibility, 36J. COMM.
64, 74 (1986). Signorielli argues that
[w]hat is most important is that even though there are some differences in
programming, the average viewer has relatively little opportunity to exercise
any kind of choice in viewing. The data point clearly to the fact that much
less programming time is devoted to serious dramas and to situation
comedies than to action-adventure programs. Thus, given the current
network programming practices in the United States, it is almost impossible
to find a heavy viewer who is not exposed to a substantial amount of
violence and action-adventure programming. In this sense, television
programming is necessarily a relatively non-selective activity.
Id.
212 See Deanna C. Robinson et al., A Consumer Modelfor TV Audiences: The Case of
TV Violence, 6 CoMM. RES. 181, 196 (1979).213 Id. at 197.
214 The networks confidence in ratings may be one factor confounding their
understanding of viewer preferences. Present ratings measure only the number of
viewers tuned in to a particular program: they tell decision-makers nothing about the
quality or nature of an audience's involvement with a program. See Barrie Gunter,
On the Future of Television Ratings, 37J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 359,360
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B. The Possibility for Change
Despite the existence of a firmly entrenched culture of violence
as presented in the preceding Section, change is possible:
[T]here is the possibility of creativity and innovation in commer-
cial television because, thanks to both organizational and human
factors, ratings, reliance on track records and the use of formulas
do not-and, in fact cannot-completely routinize the television
production process. A certain amount of inspiration or entrepre-
neurship is still necessary.... It is the sad, yet somehow sweet,
irony of television that the industry produces these successes
despite itself.21
Such an optimistic perspective is supported by the real life
experiences of producers who have demonstrated that innovation
and creativity can surface once the structural fetters of the industry
are removed. Consider, for example, the experience of John
Mantley, executive producer of the series Gunsmoke, who faced the
national antiviolence campaign of the 1960s:
"I wanted to quit Gunsmoke, but, when the violence restrictions
came in, nobody knew what to do with the show and they got out
of the way because they didn't think I was going to be able to save
it... and nobody wants to be associated with a failure! In one
(1993) ("Indeed, most television ratings systems, technically speaking, measure
viewers' presence in the room with the television set switched on, rather than actual
viewing."). New, experimental, qualitative audience measures that assess viewers'
involvement with a program in terms of appreciation, loyalty, and impression could
provide "far more subtle information.., about a program's value to viewers that can
be of use to program makers, broadcasters, and advertisers." Id. at 361 (citation
omitted) (arguing that in the approaching age of increasing television channel
capacity, traditional ratings systems will become less and less valuable as the size of
program audiences diminishes). An interesting hypothesis for future study might be
that viewers are attracted to and content to view violent programs when flipping
casually through channels looking for anything to fill the screen while doing the
dishes; but when people make deliberate choices about programs they intend to
engage in, they crave more meaningful programming. In other words, people tune
in to violence as background entertainment, but, as a general matter, viewers seek
more substantive fare.
... Robert Pekurny, Coping with Television Production, in INDIVIDUALS IN MASS
MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS: CREATIVITY AND CONSTRAINT, supra note 197, at 143.
Consider as well Becker's suggestion that
[c]onventions make collective activity simpler and less costly in time, energy,
and other resources; but they do not make unconventional work impossible,
only more costly and difficult. Change can and does occur whenever
someone devises a way to gather the greater resources required or
reconceptualizes the work so it does not require what is not available.
BECKER, supra note 127, at 35.
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sense, that is good, because I love it if they don't 'help.' But, you
see, when those violence restrictions came in, I was suddenly able
to have the freedom to make shows of my own. Can you imagine
any network permitting me to make a show about a Jewish
patriarch in a western, not just about the patriarch, himself, but
about his dedication to the Torah?! I mean, it was impossible
before those restrictions came in. Or to make a show called 'The
Fires of Ignorance,' about the need for compulsory child educa-
tion. All of these things I was able to do because nobody knew
what to tell me to do with the show."" 6
This final Section will suggest a number of approaches designed
to free producers and the industry from the structural constraints
outlined in Part IV. It is worth repeating here the notion that
excessive violent content is a symptom of the larger problem of
structural censorship within the television industry. The solution to
the problem of violence and censorship is not to impose further
content-based restrictions on the production process, but rather to
remove, or reduce, the existing structural constraints. The actions
described below require more patience than labeling requirements
or outright bans on violent programming, but these proposals
properly recognize the range of structural influences on program
content. Because structural change is less tangible than highly
visible labeling approaches, legislators are unlikely to champion
these proposals before their colleagues and constituents. Whatever
their political viability, however, these sorts of structural mecha-
nisms are the only means available for improving the state of televi-
sion without invoking content-based measures that threaten to
violate both the law and sound policy.
Although the structural approach might lead to a variety of
policy proposals directed at various constraints on the production
system, this Section will focus on two of the most prominent aspects
of the structural model: the influence of advertising and the
constraints on creative labor in the production process. Reducing
the driving influence of advertisers and eliminating current
constraints on creative personnel should be top priorities for
anyone concerned with real change in the television industry.
216 NEWCOMB & ALLEY, supra note 148, at 126.
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C. Reducing Advertising Influence/Increasing
Viewer Participation
We aren't going to get rid of violence until we get rid of advertisers. The
advertiser wants something exciting with which to get the audience.
Violence equals excitement equals ratings. As the population has grown,
the number of TV viewers has not increased proportionally, so "tougher
stories" is the word today.
217
The key to breaking the cycle of market influence depends
largely on measures aimed to challenge the traditional reliance of
networks and advertisers on violent programming to generate mass
audiences. Removing or reducing advertiser influence on product
content is the most obvious, but also the most difficult, avenue for
change in the industry. Any strategy to create greater program
diversity must begin by altering the incentive structure within the
dual product market framework to encourage the industry to value
viewer preferences as much as, if not more than, delivering ratings
to advertisers. In recent years, a number of commentators have
proposed schemes consistent with the structural approach and its
criticism of advertising's influence over content.
One solution might be to remove the advertisers' ability to
sponsor and thereby influence individual programs. One commen-
tator, Patrick Fahey, in discussing mechanisms for reducing the
negative effects of product boycotts on network television content,
has advocated the adoption of program-blind advertising:
Under this system, advertisers would designate the number of
people they wish to address in each demographic category and the
network would randomly assign to them commercial spots
achieving this level, a procedure which is similar to that currently
employed in the upfront market.... The advertiser would be
prohibited from choosing or avoiding any controversial or topical
programming under the guise of preserving its corporate im-
age.
218
By removing advertisers' capacity to dictate exactly what shows they
wish to sponsor, networks would be far less vulnerable to adver-
217 Baldwin & Lewis, supra note 27, at 314 (quoting an unidentified writer for the
television show The Untouchables).
218 Patrick M. Fahey, Advocacy Group Boycotting of Network Television Advertisers and
Its Effects on Programming Content, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 691 (1991). Fahey also
proposes the establishment of internal network standards and practices departments
that include advocacy group members, thereby ensuring those organizations access
to program decisions. See id. at 696-708.
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tisers' protests over, or preferences for, aspects of specific shows
and would thus be able to exercise greater freedom in determining
program content.219  Similarly, a program-blind advertising ar-
rangement would compel networks to focus on their aggregate
season-long ratings rather than individual program ratings.
In the current environment, networks must abandon low-rated
shows because of the difficulty in selling small audiences to firms
interested in getting the most bang for their advertising dollars. In
a program-blind system, however, because the network retains the
discretion to distribute an advertiser's audience preferences over
the course of a season, it can combine the audiences of several
lower-rated programs to achieve the level desired by an advertiser.
This in turn could reduce the incentive for network officials to
micro-manage the program production process, thereby giving
creative personnel precious breathing space. Because a program-
blind advertising system removes the pressure on networks and
producers to try to make every show a ratings bonanza, this
proposal could encourage greater patience and experimentation
220with programs.
Reducing advertiser influence is, or course, meaningless without
simultaneous efforts aimed at increasing viewer participation in
programming decisions. One proposal suggests mandating access
for citizen-oriented programming: Ralph Nader and Claire Riley
have proposed the creation of an "Audience Network," which would
be a "nonpartisan, nonprofit corporation open to all citizens for a
nominal fee."221 The Network would receive one hour of airtime
per day on commercial radio and television stations to run program-
ming selected through the democratic process.222 Airtime could
219 One consequence of this scheme, however, might be that the networks, rather
than deciding to take greater risks with innovative programming, would adhere even
more fervently to established conventions to assure that advertisers could be certain
of the type and tone of shows they might be sponsoring in a content-blind system.
" A simple variation of the content-blind approach could be to limit advertising
to time slots before and after, but not during, programs. The European Community
has already adopted this type of regulation. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL.,
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 349 (1993). Congress has also
recently imposed limitations on broadcast advertising aired during children's
programming. See 47 U.S.C. § 303a(a)-(b) (Supp. III 1991) (limiting advertising to
10.5 minutes per hour on weekends and 12 minutes per hour during the week).
"' Ralph Nader & Claire Riley, Oh, Say Can You See: A Broadcast Network for the
Audience, 5J.L. & POL. 1, 68 (1988). Nader and Riley include a model statute for the
Audience Network following their article. See id. at 87-125.
See id. at 68.
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be apportioned to local community groups, citizen organizations or
nonprofit groups such as the Cancer Society or Girl Scouts:
The possibilities for community and national use of air time are
numerous.... Among the many possibilities currently not on the
air are programs exploring the effects of the mass media and
programs showcasing local and regional culture or traditions.
Audience Network could provide thorough and timely information
on activities of local, state and federal governmental bodies.
Interesting discussions of local, state and national political
candidates' views and electronic town meetings, where public
officials discuss important issues and get immediate feedback from
constituent viewers, are also possible.
223
While the Audience Network would undoubtedly increase the
level of citizen participation in television content, the overwhelming
balance of programming (namely, the remaining twenty-three in the
day) would continue to be subject to traditional structural con-
straints. More daring proposals could seek to equalize the balance
between public and private television by increasing the amount of
time required for Audience Network programming.
A more direct, and certainly more controversial, means of
countering the influence of advertising revenues on content might
be found in schemes that redistribute revenues to fund public or
viewer-responsive programming. Although initially offered as a
solution to the effects of advertising on content in the newspaper
context, Professor C. Edwin Baker's Tax-Advertising/Subsidize-
Readers ("TA-SR") proposal could possibly apply as well to the
television industry.224 Baker's proposal, designed to counter the
newspaper practice of catering to advertisers' needs over readers',
22 Id. at 71. Of course, not all programming would necessarily focus on
government affairs:
A week's worth of local programming could include a community theater
company profile, a documentary on the effects of drought on the region
and a program on the impact of smoking on community health. The local
chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union could produce a documentary
on racial and ethnic tension, and a high school play could be televised.
Programming could also include issues such as housing the homeless,
pollution, labor unions, social security, veterans' issues and the best and the
worst of public schools.
Id. at 71-72.
24 See C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS 85-91 (1994).
Baker's proposal is based on a thorough presentation of the various ways advertising
restricts media content. See id. at 44-70. An earlier version of this proposal is
presented in the article, C. Edwin Baker, Advertisingand a Democratic Press, 140 U. PA.
L. REV. 2097 (1992) [hereinafter Baker, Advertising].
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would tax newspaper advertising revenues and then redistribute the
resulting pool to papers based on circulation: "Papers that received
more than an average proportion of revenue from advertising would
make an increased payment while those receiving less than the
average portion of revenue from advertising would receive a credit
either reducing their taxes or possibly resulting in receipt of a
payment from the government." 225  The result, Baker argues,
would be to "lessen papers' incentive to respond to advertisers'
concerns, and thus increase their incentive to respond to the other
purchaser, the reader."22 In the television context, a similar plan
might tax advertising to help fund noncommercial television,227 or
perhaps even Nader and Riley's Audience Network organization.
Although politically infeasible as a practical solution, Baker's
proposal is significant because it points to the necessity of reducing
the industry's reliance on advertising revenues to encourage
attention to viewer preferences.
228
In sum, any attempt to improve the diversity of television
content must grapple with the imbalance between advertiser and
public control over programming. Such efforts will need to include
measures to insulate networks from advertiser influences while at
the same time substantially increasing the power of viewers to
expand and shape television content.
D. Occupational Constraints: Encouraging Creativity
On the occupational front, efforts to reduce the production of
violent material should focus on empowering the craftspeople
involved in television production. Studies of the production process
repeatedly identify producers and writers as the last line of creative
defense against the commercial interests of networks and advertis-
ers. Strengthening the collective hand of these individuals through
existing professional organizations or unions could help level the
balance of power between craftspeople and profit-oriented execu-
tives. 229 Strategies for change must counteract the socialization
Baker, Advertising, supra note 224, at 2181 n.285.
22 BAKER, supra note 224, at 86.
2 See id. at 113.
28 Politically more appealing alternatives to TA-SR systems might create taxes on
the sale of television sets to support public television. Such proposals are inadequate,
however, because they leave the current advertising structure intact. See id. at 114.
' For example, the Writers Guild of America could negotiate collective
bargaining agreements or individual contracts for its members that reserve greater
degrees of creative control over program content than is available today. The Guild
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processes that have shaped the occupational roles in production.
The experience of producers who have had the rare opportunity
to operate without the usual constraint of network interference is
encouraging. For example, Hugh Wilson and John Mantley, two
producers who achieved considerable commercial success through
formula programming, both succeeded in developing groundbreak-
ing material once they were able to exercise real authority over their
projects. In Mantley's case, the freedom came when the network
abandoned Gunsmoke in the wake of the 1960s antiviolence
campaigns.230 In contrast, Wilson bought his own freedom for
Frank's Place by negotiating a "complete hands-off deal" with the
then struggling CBS network.231 Campbell and Reeves suggest
that Wilson's ability to retain creative control over Frank's Place fits
an established pattern in which financially troubled firms stimulate
innovation and experimentation: "A desperate company is more
likely to seek out new ideas and new talent, more likely to sponsor
experimentation, more likely to take risks-and less likely to
interfere in the creative process." 23 2 This observation suggests an
interesting hypothesis: as competition between a growing number
of video outlets increases-and the number of firms operating near
the margin of profitability increases-the possibility of expanded
creative freedom for craftspeople will improve.
As for the present, increasing creative control over programming
decisions can take two possible paths. First, policymakers could
take measures to facilitate the separation of business and creative
interests within media firms. For example, within the broadcast
licensing context, the FCC could give preferential treatment to
applicants who have provided for formal guarantees of editorial
freedom for creative personnel within their organizational struc-
tures. Similarly, access to future common-carrier television systems
could be conditioned on an applicant firm's agreement to express
limitations on business interference in creative matters. These
limitations might allow for general network oversight of program-
ming decisions, such as the ordering of general story ideas and
series, but would forbid the sort of day-to-day interference that
and other professional associations could also encourage their members to
experiment with the medium and avoid reinforcing existing conventions wherever
possible.
2 0 See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
231 Campbell & Reeves, supra note 205, at 8.
232 id.
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results in endless squabbles over minute character or plot develop-
ments. More radical proposals might require formal organizational
autonomy for creative producers and writers.
A second approach to increasing creative control would seek to
place increasing business control in the hands of creative personnel
who have a greater interest in serving viewers rather than advertis-
ers. 233 The program output of a network owned exclusively by
producers, writers, and actors presumably would look quite
different from the fare prevalent today. Like any other network, a
creative-owned firm would need to tailor its efforts to insure a
threshold level of audiences, but the network controlled by creative
people would almost certainly take greater risks with nonconven-
tional programming.23 4  The success of such networks would
hopefully stimulate greater experimentation among traditional
networks as well.
E. Summary
Consistent with the principle of the structural approach, efforts
aimed at increasing creative influence in programming must
coincide with efforts aimed at correcting the imbalance between
viewer and advertiser program control. Taken alone, each of the
measures suggested above are unlikely to have a measurable impact
on reducing violence or promoting diversity. If implemented as
part of a comprehensive structural strategy, the effect on the
industry could be unprecedented. Policymakers should consider a
regulatory framework which incorporates the proposals presented
above, as well as others that spring from a structural analysis of the
television industry. This will require special efforts to maximize
231 Professor Baker has advocated this approach as a means of countering the
effects of media ownership. See C. Edwin Baker, Mergerphobia, THE NATION, Nov. 8,
1993, at 520, 521. As Baker puts it:
I suspect that meaningless sexual innuendo and constant violence is less
what TV writers and directors want to produce than what corporate
executives demand in order to maximize their audience or please advertis-
ers. Rather than reduce the current rate of violence through government
censorship, we might try increasing ownership or control by people who
have a personal stake in the quality, not merely the profitability, of the
cultural products.
Id. at 521.
2" The chances of this happening would be greatly enhanced if such networks
were publicly funded. Even if supported by advertising, however, creative-based
networks might be effective at developing innovative programs that advertisers would
be excited to sponsor.
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consumer choice in the television information and entertainment
markets by removing the constraints (legal, occupational, organiza-
tional, market, and technological) on creativity and program
diversity that have plagued the medium since its inception.
Although structural change might seem politically implausible,
technological developments in the medium provide a convenient
opportunity for reexamining the television industry. The changing
nature of the video environment is the wild card of the violence
dilemma. Speculation regarding 500-channel cable systems has
already spawned a new wave of specialized networks. 23 5 Perhaps
the only near certainty for the future of television is that the new
technologies will bring viewers a larger slate of "channels" from
which to select their program choices. Whether the increase in
channel choices will precipitate an increase in program choices
remains uncertain. According to some industry observers, including
former FCC chairman Alfred Sikes, "more channels means more
opportunities." 26  Others argue that in a 500-channel environ-
ment, violence might become more prevalent than today, as
programmers will fall back on the time-worn convention of adding
violent material to a show to attract ever-shrinking segments of the
viewing audience in an increasingly competitive television market.
In this scenario, the "advance" of technology might leave viewers
worse off than they were previously. 217 Either way, the march of
2-5 See Lee Winfrey, Coming Soon to a TV Near You, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 23,
1993, at El, E6 (listing a dozen new channels scheduled to debut in the near future,
including three new home shopping channels, a military channel, a golf channel, an
all-talk channel, a history channel, ajazz channel, and a "romance classics" channel).
236 Alfred C. Sikes, Remarks at the International Radio & Television Society
Newsmaker Luncheon, Sept. 19, 1991, available in LEXIS, FEDCOM Library, FCC
File, 1991 FCC LEXIS 5003, at *5. Sikes continued:
Commercial success in broadcasting will not be ensured through
mindless shows built around sex, gratuitous violence, or the latest effort to
exploit bizarre conduct advanced by so-called "talent researchers." . ..
One encouraging sign is the discovery by the Public Broadcasting
System (PBS) and some commercial broadcasters and cable network
operators. They are discovering that quality programming has more "shelf
life" in the new video markets. A new media world of hundreds of channels
delivered via broadcast, fiber, and satellite paths will-I predict-place a real
premium on quality and resulting "shelf life."
Id. at *6-*7.
217 With respect to the relationship between technology and advertising, media
critics have speculated that new technologies will increase the power of advertisers
over consumers:
The fashionable, faux futurism predicts that this time will be different, that
this time new media technology will guarantee the individual the upper
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technology provides communications policymakers with a prime
opportunity to counteract the homogenizing forces that have ruled
television during the latter half of the twentieth century.
CONCLUSION
During 1993, television violence emerged as an issue of public
and private concern. Unfortunately, the resulting policy proposals
failed to fully recognize nature of the issue. This Comment has
attempted to show that the problem of violence is but a symptom of
a more serious problem in the television industry. Structural
constraints in the production process, supported primarily by the
concerns of advertisers, operate to inhibit program diversity and
innovation. The solution to this problem should not be the further
suppression of expression. Instead, policymakers should seek
content-neutral alternatives that stimulate creativity and access for
a wide variety of ideas and shows. Unfortunately, there is no
guarantee that such structural strategies will necessarily either
reduce the level of violence or increase viewer choice. Until society
concedes that it can or must tolerate content-based, reactive
measures reflecting both bad law and bad policy, however, these
strategies are the most promising options citizens have for improv-
ing the video landscape.
This Comment has suggested that current content-based
thinking on the dilemma of television violence suffers from a
narrow vision of the way television content is shaped by influences
in the industry. The structural approach described and advocated
herein produces strategies for violence reduction which are more
precisely aimed at influencing the root motivations for the produc-
tion of violence. Particularly in light of changing technologies,
communications policymakers should begin considering how the
current television structure inhibits program diversity and what can
be done to establish a system that encourages greater creativity and
variety in the public interest.
hand over the advertiser. Maybe; maybe not. More likely, we'll see these
new media renegotiate the power relationships between individuals and
advertisers.... Advertising will not go away; it will be rejuvenated.
Michael Schrage et al., Is Advertising Finally Dead?, WIRED, Feb. 1994, at 71, 72.
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FROM THE EDrroRs
The following Articles were commissioned for a Symposium
devoted to Professor Michael Moore's book, Act and Crime: The
Philosophy of Action and Its Implications for Criminal Law (Clarendon
Press 1993), the first to present a unified account of the theory of
action presupposed by both Anglo-American criminal law and the
morality that underlies it. Professor Moore is the Leon Meltzer
Professor of Law and Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania,
and is well known for his work in criminal responsibility and natural
law.
The Symposium took place on February 17th and 18th, 1994, at
the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and the papers present-
ed and debated there were revised for publication in this, the
annual symposium issue of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.
The Law Review is honored to have hosted the conference and is
proud of the quality of scholarship it generated. We hope that the
dialogue established in these Articles will further illuminate a
previously murky area of legal thought.
The Editors would like to thank the authors for their participa-
tion, and ProfessorJay Wallace of the Philosophy Department of the
University of Pennsylvania for acting as moderator during the
Symposium.
